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THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A 225TH
ANNIVERSARY RE-INTERPRETATION
Carlton F.W. Larson*
Abstract: The importance of the Declaration of Independence to American law has been
obscured by dubious associations with natural rights jurisprudence. Legal scholars have
therefore overlooked the numerous ways in which the Declaration is relevant to a host of legal
issues. Ample textual and historical evidence demonstrates that the Declaration, not the
Articles of Confederation or the Constitution, legally constituted the United States of
America as a distinct nation in the world community. The Declaration was not the act of
thirteen states declaring their individual independence, but the act of one American people
announcing the birth of an American nation. Nor is the Declaration merely an abstract
treatise on individual natural rights. The Declaration displays a deep concern for which forms
of government will most effectively allow self-government to flourish. As such, the
Declaration speaks in constitutional language that is far more precise than we are often led to
believe.
The Declaration of Independence is 225 years old this month. All
across the country, Americans will celebrate the Fourth of July with
trumpet and song, with fireworks and good cheer. In the rarefied halls of
the legal academy, however, such celebrations will undoubtedly be
greeted with little more than an air of amused detachment. After all, we
all know that the Continental Congress actually voted for independence
on July 2, not on July 4. We all know that the Declaration was merely a
propaganda paper of no legal significance whatsoever. We all know that
its animating principle-natural law-is about as intellectually
respectable as alchemy. We all know that there is no more certain way to
get thrown out of court than to file a claim based on the Declaration of
Independence. We all know, in short, that the Declaration is utterly
irrelevant to our role as lawyers and as legal scholars.!
Law Clerk to the Honorable Michael Daly Hawkins, United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. A.B., Harvard College, 1997; J.D., Yale Law School, 2000.
I am grateful to Akhil Reed Amar for his encouragement of this project and for his many
thoughtful comments on my arguments. Pauline Maier graciously read the entire manuscript and I
am thankful for her suggestions and support. Special thanks to David Armitage for lending me a
copy of his forthcoming article and to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania for permission to quote
from its manuscript collections. My thoughts on this subject have benefited from conversations with
Steven Engel, Drew Hansen, Carl Larson, Robert Spoo, and John Turner. All errors, of course, are
mine alone.
An earlier version of the Article was the co-recipient of the Benjamin Scharps Prize for best paper
by a third-year law student at Yale Law School.
1. See, eg., infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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This Article is an invitation to re-think our entire approach to the
Declaration of Independence. I contend that a thorough understanding of
the Declaration is critical to understanding major issues in American
public law, and not simply in the trivial sense that the Declaration is
some sort of "philosophical background" to the Constitution. The
Declaration matters, and it is important that we bring to it the same level
of critical analysis that we apply to the Constitution and to other legal
texts.
This Article advances three main points. First, our view of the
Declaration's place in American law has been obscured by dubious
judicial adventures in "natural rights." The Lochner era produced a host
of decisions linking the Declaration of Independence to extreme views
of economic liberty. The lingering distrust of those decisions, and of the
impulses that motivated them, has made legal scholars less willing to
notice the numerous ways in which the Declaration has direct relevance
to American law. These legal issues range from the determination of
American citizenship to ownership of the seashore to the conditions
under which the western states entered the union. Indeed, in at least two
states, the "principles of the Declaration of Independence" appear to
have been adopted as positive law.2 As a survey of the case law will
demonstrate, the legal issues raised by the Declaration are numerous and
complex and have been the subject of litigation for well over 200 years.
Second, the Declaration was not, as is often asserted, a declaration of
thirteen states declaring their individual independence. Rather, it was the
declaration of one American people declaring the existence of one
American nation. It is therefore entirely appropriate to date the legal
existence of the American nation from July 4, 1776, and not from the
date of the Articles of Confederation or of the ratification of the
Constitution. The American nation preceded both the Articles, which
were merely declarative of that nation's existence, and the Constitution,
which "perfected" that nation. The Declaration alone legally constituted
the United States of America as a distinct nation in the world
community.
Third, the Declaration is not simply an abstract and irrelevant treatise
on the purposes of government. Rather, it is deeply concerned with what
I term "constitutional formalism," that is, a careful and detailed attention
to the structure of government and to the rule of law. Most significantly,
the Declaration addresses at length what sort of "forms" are most likely
2. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
Vol. 76:701, 2001
Declaration of Independence
to allow self-government to flourish. A close reading of the whole text of
the Declaration suggests that the "rights" about which the Declaration is
most concerned are not so much individual natural rights, but the
collective rights of the American people to self-government. George Ut's
violation of these rights-the basic rights of self-government-is what
justified American independence from Britain. This reading rescues the
Declaration from the Lochner-esque oblivion to which it has been
consigned and restores self-government to its proper place as the
Declaration's fundamental principle.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I explores the
Declaration's place in American law and in the legal academy. Part II
argues, based on substantial textual and historical evidence, that the
Declaration is best read as the act of one American people creating one
American nation. Part I explains the Declaration's roots in
"constitutional formalism." Part IV offers a brief summary and
implications for modem legal doctrine.
I. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND AMERICAN
LAW
A. Prologue: A Nineteenth-Century Perspective
Four score and seven years after the adoption of the Declaration of
Independence, Abraham Lincoln rose at Gettysburg to praise the
Declaration as the governing statement of American political
philosophy.3 It is easy to forget that Lincoln's enthusiasm for the
Declaration was far from unprecedented. Two years earlier, Lincoln's
arch-nemesis, Chief Justice Roger Brooks Taney, had sternly lectured
Lincoln on the importance of the principles of the Declaration. In the
aftermath of the surrender of Fort Sumter, Lincoln had suspended the
3. On the Gettysburg Address and Lincoln's views on the Declaration of Independence, see
generally GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYsBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA (1992).
Wills's more extravagant claims, such as his assertion that Lincoln's speech was "one of the most
daring acts of open-air sleight-of-hand ever witnessed by the unsuspecting," id. at 38, have been
effectively rebutted by Pauline Maier. PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE xix-xx, 189-208 (1997) (tracing the ways in which Lincoln's
speech tapped into larger cultural currents). If Lincoln's invocation of the Declaration was such a
novelty, one wonders why, for example, in their oral arguments in the Amistad case twenty-two
years earlier, Roger Baldwin and John Quincy Adams repeatedly invoked the principles of the
Declaration of Independence as the founding principles of the American nation. See The Arnistad,
40 U.S. 518, 549, 552, 556, 557 (1841).
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writ of habeas corpus along the route between Washington and
Philadelphia, and the army had imprisoned a Confederate sympathizer,
John Merryman, in Baltimore's Fort McHenry4 (the site of the battle that
inspired Francis Scott Key to write "The Star-Spangled Banner"). In an
opinion denying Lincoln's power to suspend habeas corpus, Taney
admonished the President that "[t]he constitution of the United States is
founded upon the principles of government set forth and maintained in
the Declaration of Independence." 5 One such principle was civilian
control of the military, as evidenced by the Declaration's charge that
George E[[ "'had affected to render the military independent of, and
superior to, the civil power."' 6
Taney's invocation of the Declaration was not merely a clever riposte
to Lincoln, who had himself invoked the principles of the Declaration
throughout his political career;7 rather, the Declaration figured
prominently in Taney's view of the constitutional order. The most
extensive discussion of the Declaration in a Supreme Court opinion is in
none other than Taney's infamous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sanford,8 in
which Taney explained at great length why the Declaration did not
resolve the issue of Dred Scott's citizenship. Taney insisted that the
words "all men" in the phrase "all men are created equal" simply could
not be understood to apply to blacks. 9 A contrary interpretation would
have rendered the conduct of the men who drafted the Declaration
"utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted."10
This was impossible, Taney argued, because "the men who framed this
declaration were great men-high in literary acquirements-high in their
sense of honor and incapable of asserting principles inconsistent with
those on which they were acting." "
To Lincoln, the Dred Scott decision was an abomination. Taney's
opinion, Lincoln argued, did "'obvious violence to the plain
4. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 299 (1995); see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL
THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 26-39 (1998) (discussing the Merryman
dispute).
5. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 n.3 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., DONALD, supra note 4, at 269, 277; WILLS, supra note 3, at 100 (discussing
Lincoln's views on the Declaration).
8. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).






unmistakable meaning of the Declaration"' such that if the Declaration's
framers were to "'rise from their graves, they could not at all recognize
it.""' 2 Taney's interpretation of the Declaration has been quite properly
consigned to the dustbin of history, but it is worth noting the efforts he
expended in trying to distinguish away the language of the Declaration.
Taney could have easily argued that the Declaration had no relevance to
this issue. Justice Curtis said as much in his dissent, 3 and Justice
McLean, in a separate dissent, ignored the Declaration completely. 4 But
for Taney, as for Lincoln, it was inconceivable to reach a decision
contrary to the Declaration of Independence. Despite all their
differences, Lincoln and Taney shared one deeply held belief-that a
proper understanding of the Declaration of Independence was essential
to understanding the Constitution and laws of the United States of
America.
B. The Declaration at the Millennium
To modem constitutional scholars, this notion seems as quaint as one
of Matthew Brady's faded daguerreotypes. As the introduction to this
Article suggests, the position of the Declaration of Independence in
recent constitutional thought is one of utter and complete irrelevance.
Benno Schmidt, the former dean of Columbia Law School and former
President of Yale University claims, "American constitutional law is
positive law, and the Declaration of Independence has no standing in
constitutional interpretation whatsoever."'" The most recent volume of
Laurence Tribe's treatise on constitutional law mentions the Declaration
only twice over the course of 1381 pages. 6 One might expect that Bruce
Ackerman's comprehensive study of American constitutional
12. DONALD, supra note 4, at 201 (quoting 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 404
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1990)).
13. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 574-75 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (arguing that although
Taney's interpretation of the Declaration was probably wrong, the issue was beside the point
because the real issue was the status of free blacks at the time of the ratification of the Constitution).
14. See id. at 529 (McLean, J., dissenting).
15. Interview by Lewis E. Lehrman with Benno Schmidt, quoted in Lewis E. Lehrman, On Jaffa,
Lincoln, Marshall, and Original Intent, in HARRY V. JAFFA Er AL., ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 3, 5 (1994).
16. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40, 74-75 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing
potential value of hypertext links between the Constitution and "arguably relevant" passages of the
Declaration and discussing the Declaration in the context of extra-constitutional appeals to "values"
generally).
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development would refer to the document that affected the greatest
constitutional transformation of all-American independence from
Britain. But Ackerman cites the Declaration only five times over the
course of two volumes, and never for any substantive point. 17 For most
legal academics, the Declaration is little more than a political puff
piece," or a "propaganda manifesto," as Richard Hofstadter described
it. 9 It is of historical interest,20 perhaps, but of no more use to the world
of law than the Pledge of Allegiance or the diary of Paul Revere.
The Declaration's disappearance from the world of legal scholarship
contrasts sharply with its continued place of prominence in our nation's
political life. One hundred years after the Gettysburg Address, Martin
Luther King, Jr., stood on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in
Washington, D.C., and called on the nation to live up to its "creed"
expressed in the Declaration of Independence.2 President Clinton has
noted that he "reread[s]" the Declaration "on a regular basis"22 and has
stated that "if you believe in the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution... then you are an American."' On the opposite end of the
17. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 142, 213, 216, 321 (1991); 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 77 (1998).
18. See Dan Himmelfarb, Note, The Constitutional Relevance of the Second Sentence of the
Declaration of Independence, 100 YALE L.J. 169, 169 nn.2-5 (1990) (surveying the literature); see
also WALTER BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION SERIOUSLY 16 (1987) ("It has become common to
hear scholars dismiss the Declaration as mere propaganda, or a clever lawyer's brief with a dash of
natural law added for spice, a convenient weapon to wield against the British, and no more.").
19. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 269 (1968).
20. Even this might be doubted. The two greatest historical studies of the American Revolution,
as fresh and compelling today as when they were first published over thirty years ago, ignore the
Declaration almost entirely. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787
(1969). Such treatment from our most eminent historians helps to confirm the legal academy's view
of the Declaration as trivial and unimportant.
21. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SPEECHES 330, 334 (Brian MacArthur ed., 1992).
22. President William J. Clinton, Remarks to Senior Citizens Council (July 28, 1998), available
at 1998 WL 425314.
23. President William J. Clinton, Remarks at Portland State Univ. Commencement (June 18,
1998), available at 1998 WL 321814. Clinton's grasp of the Declaration, however, is far from firm.
In one speech, Clinton observed that "we are bound together by a written Constitution that's 220
years old, going back to the Declaration of Independence," thus confusing the Declaration and the
Constitution. President William J. Clinton, Remarks to the U.S. Agricultural Communicators
Congress (July 16, 1996), available at 1996 WL 399864. In another speech, he remarked, "The last
time I checked, the Constitution said, 'of the people, by the people and for the people.' That's what
the Declaration of Independence says," thus confusing the Declaration, the Constitution, and the
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political spectrum, Republican presidential candidates Alan Keyes and
Gary Bauer repeatedly argued that the practice of abortion violates the
Declaration of Independence. Keyes declared that he stood "without
apology for the principles articulated in the Declaration of
Independence, and in particular for the unalienable right to life of all
human offspring."'24 Bauer contended that he would "put no justice on
the court that does not understand the clear, moral idea found in the
Declaration of Independence that is the basis of this country. ' In one
presidential debate, all but one of the Republican candidates mentioned
the Declaration of Independence as an essential item for any time
capsule prepared for the twenty-first century.26 Representative Henry
Hyde of Illinois, in closing arguments in the impeachment trial of
President Clinton, appealed to "our country's birth certificate, our
charter of freedom, our Declaration of Independence."'" A 1989 federal
act described the Declaration as "one of the greatest documents in
human history."' 8 Few Americans, I suspect, can recall any phrases from
the Constitution, but almost everyone knows that "all men are created
equal" and that they have a right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness."'  Indeed, in 2000 the New Jersey Senate passed a bill
requiring schoolchildren to recite that portion of the Declaration of
Independence each day along with the Pledge of Allegiance.30 And a rare
Gettysburg Address. President William J. Clinton, Remarks to the People of Orange County (Oct.
17, 1996), available at 1996 WL 594985.
24. Defining Moments: Alan Keyes, THE HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Jan. 30,2000, available at 2000
WL 9332687.
25. Excerpts from GOP Debate, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, Jan. 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL
3303828. Bauer observed that "the first right [the Declaration] lists is the right to life." Id.
26. Candidates Make Capsule Suggestions, Jan. 10, 2000, ASSOCIATED PRESS ONLINE, available
at 2000 WL 3305080.
27. Congressman Henry J. Hyde, Closing Remarks at Impeachment Trial of William J. Clinton
(Jan. 16, 1999), available at 1999 WL 8084056.
28. Act of May 17, 1989, Pub. L.No. 101-30, 103 Stat. 60, 61.
29. In the interest of our nation's forests, I have departed from the strict requirements of the
Bluebook when citing to the Declaration of Independence. Adherence to the relevant citation rule
would swell the footnotes to an intolerable length, with only an imperceptible benefit to the reader.
As form should always follow function, even in the arcane world of legal citation, I have not
provided footnotes for every quotation from the Declaration. Instead, the Declaration is reproduced
in full in the Appendix, where the interested reader can peruse it at leisure. In cases where I have
added emphasis to the text, however, a traditional footnote so noting has been included. I am
grateful to the editors of the Washington Law Review for accommodating this approach.
30. Ron Marsico, Senate Clears Recitation of Declaration in School, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), June 27, 2000, at 13, available at 2000 WL 23585492. Some opponents of the measure felt it
"could send a wrong message to girls." Id. The measure should nonetheless please Gary Bauer; on
Washington Law Review
original printing of the Declaration recently sold for $8.1 million at a
Sotheby's auction. The buyer, television and movie producer Norman
Lear, intends to make the printing the focus of a traveling exhibit and
patriotic show.3
C. Noscitur a Sociis: The Taint ofLochner
Given the Declaration's deep resonance in American public life, why
do legal academics view it with such suspicion? The answer, I believe, is
that the Declaration has been tainted by judicial decisions of dubious
constitutional merit. The celebration of the Declaration in Dred Scott
was followed by similarly fulsome praise in the decisions of the Lochner
era. One of the earliest decisions in this mold was Butcher's Union
Slaughter-house & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-house Co.,32 in which two concurring justices
invoked the Declaration to protect economic liberty. Justice Bradley
argued that the "right to follow any of the common occupations of life is
an inalienable right" secured by the Declaration of Independence.33
Justice Field was even more exuberant, announcing that the Declaration
was a "new evangel of liberty to the people," and explaining that the
phrase "pursuit of happiness" meant "the right to pursue any lawful
business or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent with the equal
rights of others, which may increase their prosperity or develop their
faculties, so as to give to them their highest enjoyment."34  These
sentiments soon worked their way into governing law. In the 1897
decision of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis,35 the
Supreme Court ruled that the state of Texas could not require railroads
the campaign trail he offered twenty dollars to any young person who could recite that portion of the
Declaration. See Tamara Lytle, Underdogs Want to Sway Agendas, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-
SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 2000, available at 2000 WL 5636852. New Jersey also requires schools to give
each pupil a copy of the Declaration of Independence upon "graduation from any elementary
school." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:36-18 (West 2001).
31. Phil Hirschkorn, Norman Lear Plans Traveling Show for U.S. Declaration of Independence
(June 30, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/STYLE/arts/06/30/declaration.02/index.html (last
visited July 31, 2001).
32. 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
33. Id. at 762 (Bradley, J., concurring); see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
116 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting that the phrase "pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration
of Independence is equivalent to "property").
34. Butcher's Union, Ill U.S. at 756-57 (Field, J., concurring).
35. 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
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to pay attorneys' fees in tort actions. The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Brewer, noted that the Declaration is the "thought and the spirit" of the
Constitution and observed that "it is always safe to read the letter of the
Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration of Independence."36 In this
case, the Court read the Declaration's statement that "all men are created
equal" to mean that such tort legislation violated the "equality of rights
which is the foundation of free government."37 Four years later, the
Court relied on this language to strike down a statute governing the
operations of large stockyards.38 Lower courts, too, wielded the
Declaration in defense of laissez-faire constitutionalism. A district court
in South Carolina proclaimed in 1907 that "the right of every citizen to
work where he will,... to select not only his employer, but his
associates... is one of those inalienable rights formulated in the
Declaration of Independence." '39 The Ninth Circuit ruled in 1937 that the
National Labor Relations Board could not use its powers to protect
unionized employees, because the term "liberty" as used "in the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution and in the Declaration of Independence
included the right to freely contract."" As late as 1943, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota stated that a statute requiring the licensing of
professional photographers was inconsistent with an individual's right to
the "pursuit of happiness" under the Declaration of Independence."
This tight intertwining of the Declaration with the most extreme
forms of Lochner-ism suggests why academics fear giving significant
weight to the Declaration. The Declaration's sonorous phrases seem to
provide little guidance in determining the scope of the liberty of which it
speaks, and the document can be cited for the most dubious of causes.
Indeed, many of the Declaration's most fervent supporters are precisely
those people with whom the legal academy is least likely to sympathize.
For years, tax protestors have unsuccessfully argued that the federal
36. Id. at 160.
37. Id. In an 1891 address at Yale Law School, Justice Brewer (who was Justice Field's nephew)
contended, "When, among the affirmatives of the Declaration of Independence, it is asserted that the
pursuit of happiness is one of the unalienable rights," it means that government cannot interfere
with the "acquisition, possession and enjoyment of property." Justice David J. Brewer, Address at
Yale Law School (1891), quoted in Owen M. Fiss, David J. Brewer: The Judge as Missionary, in
PHILIP J. BERGAN ET AL., THE FIELDS AND THE LAW 53, 59 (Federal Bar Council 1986).
38. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79, 107 (1901).
39. Exparte Drayton, 153 F. 986, 989 (D.S.C. 1907).
40. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 87 F.2d 611, 615 (9th Cir. 1937).
41. See State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 918 (N.D. 1943).
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income tax laws violate the Declaration of Independence. 42 In 1972, a
New York Court of Appeals judge contended that abortion was illegal
under the Declaration of Independence, because the Declaration has the
"force of law" and abortion violates the "natural law" that the
Declaration invokes.43 Pro se litigants turn to the Declaration with
disturbing regularity, invoking it as a palliative for almost every
conceivable injury.44 Lacking any determinate or precise meaning, the
42. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 623 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that defendant
in tax case filed an 84-page motion to dismiss, which was "lavishly larded with citations to the
Declaration of Independence" and which argued that federal criminal jurisdiction was
unconstitutional outside of the District of Columbia); Burroughs v. Wallingford, 780 F.2d 502, 503
(5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting argument that tax liens violated "unalienable" rights secured by the
Declaration of Independence); Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460, 461 (8th Cir. 1985) (noting that tax
protestor had written book entitled "The Tax Rebel's Guide to the Constitution and the Declaration
of Independence"); United States v. Farber, 679 F.2d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that tax
protestor included copies of the Declaration of Independence and the Mayflower Compact in his
return); United States v. Schmitz, 542 F.2d 782, 783, 785-786 (8th Cir. 1976) (rejecting argument
that 1040 forms "interfere with and obstruct... duties and rights under the Declaration of
Independence"); Koll v. Wayzata State Bank, 397 F.2d 124, 125 (8th Cir. 1968) (dismissing claim
that bank had engaged in conspiracy to deprive claimant of "'rights, privileges and immunities'
secured by the Declaration of Independence" and noting that the complaint consisted of "16 printed
pages of disconnected, incoherent, and rambling statements" challenging the constitutionality of the
income tax); McKenney v. Blumenthal, 1979 WL 1342, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 23, 1979) (rejecting
claim that IRS procedures violated the Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence);
Steinbrecher v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 1977 WL 1287, at *1 (W.D. Tex Aug. 15, 1977)
(rejecting challenge to tax laws that rested jurisdiction on, inter alia, the Declaration of
Independence and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787).
43. Byrn v. N. Y. City Health & Hosps. Corp., 286 N.E.2d 887, 893 (N.Y. 1972) (Burke, J.,
dissenting).
44. See, e.g., Schifanelli v. United States, 865 F.2d 1259, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 22, 1988)
(rejecting pro se claim that federal officials violated the law of the Declaration of Independence and
noting that the "Declaration of Independence is a statement of ideals, not law"); Bey v. Nissan
Motors Acceptance Corp., 1992 WL 174730, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 1992) (dismissing pro se
litigant's claim that automaker's refusal to credit certain payments to a delinquent account violated
litigant's civil rights under the Declaration of Independence); Bowler v. Welsh, 719 F. Supp. 25, 26
(D. Me. 1989) (rejecting pro se claim that Declaration of Independence created jurisdiction over
disputed stock purchase); Meyer v. United States, 1987 WL 4750, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 1987)
(rejecting pro se claim that aid to insurgents in Nicaragua violates the Declaration of Independence);
Nixon v. Rose, 631 F. Supp. 794, 796 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (rejecting pro se claim that sheriff
committed treason and violated the Declaration of Independence and the Magna Carta by accepting
a check in a property sale); Demos v. Kincheloe, 563 F. Supp. 30, 31 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (denying
pro se claimant's request for a writ of mandamus requiring Congress to redraft language in the
Declaration of Independence); Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Presnick, 559 A.2d 220, 226 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1989) (rejecting as "anachronistic and ludicrous" pro se attorney's claim that location of
state disciplinary hearings violated the Declaration of Independence's complaint that George Ill had
"called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository
of public records"), aff'd, 575 A.2d 210 (Conn. 1990); Montana v. Poncelet, 610 P.2d 698, 709
(Mont. 1980) (rejecting pro se defendant's proposed jury instruction that read, "You are instructed
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Declaration becomes little more than a Rorschach test, into which
anything and everything might be read.4" The meaning of the Declaration
is therefore best left to the elected branches of government, to the
Lincolns of the world, rather than to the Taneys. The understanding of
"liberty" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has
created enough trouble; why encumber judges with the additional duty
of figuring out, for example, what constitutes "the pursuit of happiness?"
The few academics who do emphasize the Declaration do nothing to
dispel these concerns. These scholars focus almost exclusively on the
second sentence of the Declaration, and they conclude that the
Declaration is primarily about natural law and the protection of natural
rights." Accordingly, the Declaration should be read in light of its
natural law origins. "[T]he natural-rights principles embodied in the
Declaration," one scholar tells us, "are at the heart of the Constitution."'47
Not surprisingly, arguments of this sort have been a resounding failure in
the legal academy. Invoking "natural rights" in a modem law school is
about as persuasive as citing Cotton Mather's treatise on witchcraft.4
Legal Realism has effectively banished "natural rights" to a distant cage
in Felix Cohen's "menagerie of metaphysical monsters."49 Natural law
has mystical overtones that seem out of place in a modem society, and
cases that have invoked or implied natural law arguments are widely
regarded as embarrassments.50
that the Declaration of Independence reads in part: 'He (the King of Great Britain) has erected a
multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people and [e]at out their
substance').
45. See, eg., Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1456 n.4 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that it is
unhelpful to cite the Declaration of Independence since "general statements about inalienable
rights ... tell us little about the prerogatives of an individual in concrete factual situations").
46. See, eg., BERNS, supra note 18, at 17; Scoar DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS:
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 22 (1995); HARRY
V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 40 (1994). Jaffa's views are
criticized in Patrick M. O'Neil, The Declaration as Ur-Constitution: The Bizarre Jurisprudential
Philosophy of Professor Harry V. Jaffa, 28 AKRON L. REV. 237 (1995).
47. GERBER, supra note 46, at 3. Philip Hamburger argues that "[iun the eighteenth century,
however, American ideas of natural rights and natural law" were "relatively precisely defined" and
"circumscribed by their very character as natural rights." Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights,
Natural Law, and American Constitutions, 102 YALE UJ. 907, 908 (1993).
48. COTTON MATHER, THE WONDERS OF THE INVISIBLE WORLD (Boston, Benj. Harris 1693).
49. Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 829 (1935) (quoting BERTRAND RUSSELL, MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 155 (1918)).
50. See, eg., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) ("[N]ature herself... has
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman....
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Even scholars who attempt to minimize the Declaration's purported
roots in natural law do little to alleviate academics' inherent suspicion of
the document. In a recent book, Charles Black, Jr., argues that the
Declaration protects what he terms "human rights."5 Black believes that
a complete theory of human rights law can be based solely on the
Declaration, the Ninth Amendment, and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Although Black assiduously
avoids the term "natural rights," his jurisprudence of "human rights" is
largely indistinguishable from a jurisprudence of "natural rights," and it
is doubtful that his argument does much to resolve any concrete dispute
over the scope of these "human rights." Mark Tushnet also repeatedly
invokes the Declaration (appropriately rephrasing certain terms to reflect
modem sensibilities). In a recent book, Tustmet argues that the
Declaration and the Preamble to the Constitution form what he terms the
"thin Constitution." 53 From this, he draws the startling conclusion that a
proper adherence to the principles of the Declaration and the Preamble
requires the abolition of judicial review. 4
D. The Law of the Declaration
The almost exclusive emphasis that has been placed on the
Declaration's famous second paragraph" has assured that the
Declaration will always be seen as, well, a bit fluffy-fine for Fourth of
July orations, but useless for any serious analysis of legal issues. Certain
phrases of the Declaration are so familiar that it is easy to think that they
are synonymous with the whole. Thus, an imagined familiarity with the
This is the law of the Creator.") (Bradley, J., concurring); Sodero v. Sodero, 56 N.Y.S.2d 823, 827
(N.Y. Sup. 1945) (stating that natural law is "codified in the Ten Commandments").
51. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 7 (1997).
52. See id. at ix.
53. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 11 (1999).
54. See id. at 129-76. A more sensible view of the Declaration is found in J.M. Balkin, The
Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4-SPG WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 167 (1999).
Balkin sees the Declaration as consisting of "promises," which are the "soul" of the Constitution. Id.
at 169. One such promise is the promise of a democratic culture, made possible by the American
Revolution's attack on monarchy. Id. at 170. However, the document seems more concerned with
"tyranny" than with monarchy, and it never suggests that the two are synonymous. See infra Part
III.C; see also Himmelfarb, supra note 18, at 175-76.
55. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 51, at 5 (noting that he will consider only the Declaration's
opening paragraphs); Himmelfarb, supra note 18 (arguing the constitutional significance of the
Declaration solely on the basis of first sentence of the second paragraph).
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Declaration of Independence
Declaration has bred a very real contempt for its supposed vagueness
and malleability.5 6 Yet President Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney were
both convinced that a proper understanding of the Declaration was
desperately important to the world of law. Why might they have done so,
and why might we still find the Declaration relevant to our role as
lawyers? Consider the following ways in which the Declaration and law
are intricately intertwined:
Justification for State Constitutions. By justifying the independence
of the American colonies, the Declaration legitimated the drafting of
new state constitutions. Many states accordingly cited the Declaration in
the preambles to their constitutions,57 and New York included the
complete text of the Declaration in its constitution of 1777."8
Severance of English Common Law. Most American jurisdictions
recognize that English statutes and common law decisions prior to July
4, 1776, are part of American common law. 9 Courts have repeatedly
held that the Declaration severed English common law from its
American counterpart. English law after the Declaration has no force in
America and must be pled as foreign law.6
56. See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash, America's Aristocracy, 109 YALE iJ. 541, 553-54 (1999)
(reviewing TUSHNET, supra note 53) ("The Declaration has a little more substance [than the
Preamble to the Constitution], but that is not saying much. Though it gets the patriotic juices
flowing... [its] principles tell us nothing concrete.").
57. See, eg., MD. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.; N.C. CONST. of 1776, pmbl.; PA. CONST. of 1776,
pmbl.; S.C. CONST. of 1778, pmbl.; VT. CONST. of 1777, pmbl.; see also Trs. of Phillips Exeter
Acad. v. Exeter, 27 A.2d 569, 584 (N.H. 1940) (stating that "full statehood dated from the
Declaration of Independence").
58. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, pmbl.
59. See, eg., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 180 (1895); United Copper Sec. Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co., 232 F. 574, 577 (2d Cir. 1916); Greear v. Paust, 279 N.W. 568, 570
(Minn. 1938); Gwathmey v. North Carolina, 464 S.E.2d 674, 679 (N.C. 1995) (stating that the
"common law" to be applied in North Carolina is the common law of England to the extent it was in
force and use within the State at the time of the Declaration of Independence); Richards v.
Redelsheimer, 36 Wash. 325,328,78 P. 934, 935 (1904); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 43-3-1 (2000);
Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81, 85 (1896) ("[What is due process of law] depends upon the question
whether it was in substantial accord with the law and usage of England before the Declaration of
Independence, and in this country since it became a nation."); Manoukian v. Tomasian, 237 F.2d
211,215 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ("British statutes antedating the Declaration of Independence have almost
universally been regarded as having the effect of judicial precedent."). But see Penny v. Little, 4 DI.
(3 Scam.) 301, 302-03 (1841) (noting that the Illinois legislature dated American common law to
the fourth year of the reign of James I when the first territorial government was established in
America).
60. See Liverpool & G.W. Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397,445 (1889).
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Title to Land. The Declaration of Independence transferred title to
public lands from the Crown to the states,6' and fixed the boundaries of
the original thirteen colonies.62 The Declaration also transferred western
lands to the thirteen states. An 1827 Supreme Court decision held that
title to the trans-Appalachian lands did not pass by cession from Great
Britain in the 1783 Treaty of Paris; rather, these lands transferred by
right to the United States with the signing of the Declaration of
Independence.63
Creation of American Citizenship. American law dates American
citizenship to the Declaration of Independence.' By contrast, English
law holds that Americans remained British subjects until the Treaty of
Paris in 1783.65 A person in the United States on July 4, 1776, is
61. See, e.g., Phillips v. Delaware, 330 A.2d 136 (Del. 1974) (holding that title to lands held by
William Penn terminated with the Declaration and transferred by sovereign succession to the state of
Delaware); Town of Oyster Bay v. Commander Oil Corp., 677 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1998) ("by the Declaration of Independence title to the lands under tidewaters which had been
vested in the King passed to the states in which they were situated").
62. See New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 370 (1934) ("The Declaration of Independence
had made Delaware a state with boundaries fixed as of that time."); Howard v. Ingersoll, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 381, 398 (1852) ("It is well known to all of us, when the colonies dissolved their connection
with the mother country by the Declaration of Independence, that it was understood by all of them,
that each did so, with the limits which belonged to it as a colony."); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 736-37 (1838).
63. See Harcourt v. Gaillard, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 523, 527 (1827); see also Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 302 (1901) (noting that the Declaration gave the United States power to acquire
territory). Whether the western lands passed directly to individual states or to the Congress was a
divisive issue, which was finally resolved with Virginia's cession to the United States of its
remaining western claims. See PETER ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 17 (1983).
That the Declaration passed title to crown lands to the United States was well-recognized by
contemporaries. See, e.g., To the Printers of the Pennsylvania Gazette, PA. GAZETTE, Aug. 15,
1781 ("By virtue of our Declaration of Independence, we stand possessed of all that property of the
King of Britain in America, which he held by purchases from the Indians ... ").
64. See United States v. Ritchie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 525, 539-40 (1855); Inglis v. Sailor's Snug
Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 121 (1830); Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 F. Cas. 356, 358 (C.C.D. Pa.
1801) (discussing the "great privileges and rights of citizenship which resulted to the people of the
colonies, in consequence of the Declaration of Independence"). The standard history of the
American law of citizenship is JAMES H. KETINER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP,
1608-1870 (1978). Some decisions have erroneously dated citizenship to the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 167 (1874) (appearing to state that United States citizenship
dates from the Constitution, but citing no case law); Smith v. Carter, 545 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir.
1977) (quoting an unreported trial court decision asserting that United States citizenship dates from
the Constitution).
65. See Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 121. A Pennsylvania law of Dec. 5, 1778, required office-
holders to swear that they had never "since the Declaration of Independence, directly or indirectly
aided, assisted, abetted, or in any wise countenanced the King of Great Britain," and that they had
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presumed to be an American citizen, unless he actively took steps to
retain his allegiance to Britain.66 Although these distinctions are of little
consequence today, they figured in numerous eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century inheritance disputes, because only citizens could inherit real
property in America.67 The Declaration is also relevant to naturalization
proceedings, as some courts have held that an understanding of the
Declaration is an essential prerequisite to citizenship."
Treason. An important corollary to the law of citizenship is the law of
treason. The Declaration made official what colonial Americans had
been suggesting for some time-that adherence to the king of Great
Britain was treason.69 The Declaration states that "we hold [our British
brethren], as we hold the rest of Mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace,
Friends." "Enemies," of course, has a technical meaning within the law
of treason. The British were now officially the enemies, and the states
would quickly respond with a host of treason statutes designed to punish
those who aided the British cause.7 °
Requirement for Admission to the Union. Since the latter half of the
nineteenth century, Congress has required that territories seeking
statehood create constitutions that are "not repugnant to... the
principles of the Declaration of Independence." Such provisions were
part of the Enabling Acts for the territories that became Hawaii, Alaska,
New Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma, Utah, North Dakota, South Dakota,
"ever since the Declaration of Independence... demeaned [themselves] as faithful citizen[s] and
subject[s] of this, or some one of the United States." PA. GAZE=TE, May 17, 1780.
66. See Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 123-24; see also Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236 (1806)
(discussing the relation between the Declaration and citizenship).
67. See, e-g., Munro v. Merchant, 28 N.Y. 9 (1863); see also Lamoreaux v. Ellis, 50 N.W. 812,
815-16 (Mich. 1891) (evaluating citizenship of an individual's grandfather at time of Declaration to
determine individual's eligibility for the office of sheriff); State ex rel. Phelps v. Jackson, 65 A. 657,
658 (Vt. 1907) (evaluating citizenship of an individual's great-grandfather at time of Declaration to
determine individual's eligibility for the office of state's attorney).
68. See, eg., In re Goldberg, 269 F. 392, 397 (E.D. Mo. 1920) (holding that "an acquaintance
with, and working knowledge of, the principles of the Declaration of Independence" is "an
indispensable prerequisite to naturalization").
69. See, e-g., Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 255 (1830) (Johnson, J., dissenting) ("The
courts of this country all consider this transfer of allegiance as resulting from the declaration of
independence.").
70. The Declaration confirmed, rather than created, the idea that treason could be committed
against America. Although the treason statutes enacted subsequent to the Declaration were enacted
at the state level, they are nationalist in flavor and draw upon the experience of colonists prior to the
Declaration in punishing adherents to Britain as "traitors to their country." Carlton F.W. Larson,
Constructing Treason in Revolutionary Pennsylvania 107 (1997) (unpublished A.B. thesis, Harvard
University) (on file with the Harvard University Archives).
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Montana, Washington, Colorado, and Nevada.7 In an early decision, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the Enabling Act has no force
subsequent to statehood and was not intended to be "an irrevocable
limitation on the sovereign powers of the state,, 72 but other states have
rejected this narrow reading. The Supreme Court of Arizona has held
that the Enabling Act is "the fundamental and paramount law" of
Arizona; nothing in the Arizona Constitution can be "inconsistent with
the Enabling Act."73 In other words, a constitutional amendment in
Arizona is void if it conflicts with the "principles of the Declaration of
Independence." In similar fashion, the Supreme Court of Colorado has
explicitly ruled that various amendments to the Colorado constitution do
not violate the principles of the Declaration,74 which suggests that the
Declaration is also binding in Colorado.7"
71. See Act of Mar. 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 3, 73 Stat. 4, 5 (Hawaii); Act of July 7, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 3, 72 Stat. 339, 339 (Alaska); Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat.
557, 558 (New Mexico & Arizona); Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, Pub. L. No. 234, § 3, 34 Stat.
267, 269 (Oklahoma); Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (Utah); Act of Feb. 22,
1889, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677 (North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana & Washington); Act
of Mar. 21, 1864, ch. 37, § 4, 13 Stat. 32, 33 (Colorado); Act of Mar. 21, 1864, ch. 36, § 4, 13 Stat.
30, 31 (Nevada). Wyoming and Idaho were admitted without Enabling Acts.
72. Atwater v. Hassett, 111 P. 802, 813 (Okla. 1910); cf. Frantz v. Autry, 91 P. 193, 203-04
(Okla. 1907) (holding that whether proposed state constitution conformed with principles of
Declaration was a political question for the President of the United States to determine). For the
contrary view, see McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 186 F. 966, 984 (8th Cir. 1911)
(Sanbom, J., dissenting) (citing the Declaration requirement in the Oklahoma Enabling Act and
arguing that a state cannot violate with impunity the terms of its admission to the Union).
73. Murphy v. Arizona, 181 P.2d 336, 340 (Ariz. 1947); see also Princess Plaza Partners v.
Arizona, 928 P.2d 638, 643 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("[The Enabling Act] is superior to the Arizona
Constitution and laws enacted pursuant to the constitution may not conflict with the act.").
74. In re Interrogatories by the Governor Concerning Initiated Amendment No. 4, 65 P.2d 7, 10-
I1 (Colo. 1937); People ex rel. Miller v. Johnson, 86 P. 233, 236 (Colo. 1905); People ex rel. Elder
v. Sours, 74 P. 167, 171 (Colo. 1903). In a series of opinions in the 1960s, Justice Frantz argued
repeatedly that the Declaration is binding in Colorado under the Colorado Enabling Act, a point on
which his fellow justices did not choose to engage him. W. Colo. Power Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n,
411 P.2d 785, 804 (Colo. 1966) (Frantz, J., dissenting); Colo. Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v.
Case, 380 P.2d 34, 44 (Colo. 1962) (Frantz, J., specially concurring); Herbertson v. Russell, 371
P.2d 422, 428 (Colo. 1962) (Frantz, J., specially concurring); Taylor v. Welle, 352 P.2d 106, 110
(Colo. 1960) (Frantz, J., dissenting); Vogts v. Guerrette, 351 P.2d 851, 864-65 (Colo. 1960)
(Frantz, J., dissenting).
Justice Spencer of the Nebraska Supreme Court similarly argued that the Declaration is binding
under the Nebraska Enabling Act. See DeBacker v. Sigler, 175 N.W.2d 912, 914 (Neb. 1970)
(Spencer, J., dissenting); Nebraska ex rel. Belker v. Bd. of Educ. Lands & Funds, 175 N.W.2d 63,
69 (Neb. 1970) (Spencer, J., dissenting); State ex rel. Morris v. Marsh, 162 N.W.2d 262, 277 (Neb.
1968) (Spencer, J., dissenting). In none of these cases did his colleagues address this issue.
Any force the Declaration may have in these states is most likely a matter of state constitutional
law. In Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), the Supreme Court held that an Enabling Act provision
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Creation of a "Negative Constitution. " The bulk of the Declaration of
Independence consists of specific allegations against the King of Great
Britain. In the Merryman case, Chief Justice Taney cited one of these
allegations (that the King had attempted to "render the military
independent of, and superior to, the civil power") to support his
conclusion that neither President Lincoln nor the military could suspend
the writ of habeas corpus.76 Taney assumed that the Constitution would
not permit those acts that the Declaration had specifically cited as
justifying revolution. In other words, the Declaration was a sort of
"negative constitution," a source of structural limitations on the power of
government. The charges against the King can be easily converted to
positive restrictions on the government: "Thou shalt not render the
military independent of, and superior to the civil power," for example.
These commands are illustrative of the understanding of the proper role
of government that animated the Constitution and can therefore have
exceptionally persuasive weight, even if they technically lack binding
authority.
This mode of reasoning has been a powerful force in American law
since at least 1799.77 The charges against the King have been regularly
invoked by American judges to limit the powers of government. Judges
have argued that the charge, "He has refused his Assent to Laws, the
most wholesome and necessary for the public Good," limits executive
governing the location of the Oklahoma state capital was unenforceable once Oklahoma had been
granted full statehood. Id. at 570. To hold otherwise, the Court stated, would be to create two tiers of
states, those possessing the full powers traditionally reserved to states and those whose powers had
been limited by Enabling Acts. Id. at 577. On the other hand, the Court has approvingly cited
Enabling Act provisions that restrict state power over Indian tribes. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz.
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 175-76 (1973); Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. State Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 687 n.3 (1965). The former provision is a much more egregious example of
federal infringement on traditional state powers.
75. Under this view, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), might have been decided on state law
grounds. The Colorado Supreme Court could have ruled that the amendment violated the principles
of the Declaration and was therefore invalid under the Colorado Enabling Act.
76. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 n.3 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
77. See Williams' Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330, 1333 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708) (Ellsworth,
C.J.) (noting that one of the charges against the King in the Declaration is that he had refused to
permit the naturalization of aliens). In political debate, such use of the Declaration dates to at least
1783, when a writer in the Pennsylvania Gazette stated, 'let it be remembered, that one of the
reasons assigned by Congress for the declaration of Independence was, 'the King of Great Britain
had made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries."' PA. GAZETTE, Mar. 26, 1783.
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veto power;7 that the charge, "He has affected to render the Military
independent of and superior to the Civil Power," limits the power of the
military;79 that the charge, "For depriving us, in many Cases, of the
Benefits of Trial by Jury," limits the government's ability to restrict jury
trials;8" and that the charge, "For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried
for pretended Offences," limits the government's power to change venue
in criminal prosecutions.8 ' Our judiciary has never tired of reminding us
that one of the causes of the American Revolution was that George IH
had "made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of their
Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries." ' Judicial
opinions have been illuminated by even the most obscure charges of the
Declaration: "He has called together Legislative Bodies at Places
unusual... and distant";8 3  "He has endeavoured to prevent the
Population of these States";84 "He has ... sent hither Swarms of Officers
78. See, e.g., Lear Siegler, Inc., Energy Prods. Div. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1124 (9th Cir.
1988); Thirteenth Guam Legislature v. Bordallo, 430 F. Supp. 405, 409 (D. Guam 1977); Hunt v.
Hubbert, 588 So.2d 848, 863 (Ala. 1991) (Houston, J., concurring); State ex rel. Boynton v. French,
300 P. 1082, 1083 (Kan. 1931); Duxbury v. Donovan, 138 N.W.2d 692, 695 n.4 (Minn. 1965).
79. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 19 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 29 (1957); Bissonette v. Haig, 776 F.2d 1384, 1387 (8th Cir. 1985); People v. Burden, 288
N.W.2d 392, 396-97 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (Walsh, P.J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 31 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 341 n.3 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 152 (1968); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11, 16 n.9 (1955); Tray-Wrap, Inc. v. Six L's Packing Co., 984 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir. 1993);
McKeon v. Cent. Stamping Co., 264 F. 385, 387 (3d Cir. 1920); Perkins v. Scott, 57 N.H. 55, 80
(1876).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 116, 119 (1998); United States v. Palma-
Ruedas, 121 F.3d 841, 861 (3d Cir. 1997) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Zicarelli v. Dietz, 633 F.2d 312, 323-24 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Haley, 504 F. Supp. 1124,
1125 (E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Oberst, 299 P. 959, 964 (Kan. 1931); State v. Weaver, 982 S.W.2d 892,
893-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that venue provision did not "violate principles expressed
in the.. . Declaration of Independence").
82. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 198-99 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 219 (1980); O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516, 531 (1933); Harline v. DEA, 148 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1998); In
re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 191 (5th Cir. 1994); Oates v. Rogers, 144 S.W.2d 457, 459 (Ark. 1940); Lee
v. Bd. of Pension Trs., 739 A. 2d 336, 341 (Del. 1999); Gordy v. Dennis, 5 A.2d 69, 72 (Md. 1939);
Grimball v. Beattie, 177 S.E. 668, 676-77 (S.C. 1934) (describing the charge "[als almost a
controlling influence on the decisions reached herein").
83. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 359 n.2 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
84. See Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282, 440 (1849) (opinion of Justice Catron); Gorbach
v. Reno, 179 F.3d 1111, 1128 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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to harass our People, and eat out their Substance";85 "For quartering
large Bodies of Armed Troops among us";86 "For taking away our
Charters";87 "For... abolishing our most valuable laws"; 8 and "[He has
incited] the merciless Indian Savages, whose known Rule of Warfare, is
an undistinguished Destruction, of all Ages, Sexes and Conditions. 89
This use of the Declaration to limit the powers of government was aptly
summarized by a federal appellate court in 1899: "The Declaration of
Independence is not, as has sometimes been flippantly asserted, a mere
string of glittering generalities. It is a bill of rights which enters
fundamentally into the structure of our Government."9
Sovereignty. The Declaration unambiguously ended British
sovereignty over the American colonies. What the Declaration then did
with that sovereignty is much less clear. Did it create thirteen
independent, sovereign nations, or did it vest sovereignty in the
Continental Congress, or the people of the states, or in some
combination of both? The question is significant, because major issues
in American federalism hinge on the status of the states at the time of the
Constitution's ratification.9 The case law in this area, however, is
85. See State v. Jeremiah, 696 A.2d 1220, 1224 (RI. 1997); Nancy Thielen Sch. of Piano v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 486 N.W.2d 32, 35 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., concurring).
86. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435,459 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wallace v.
Ford, 21 F. Supp. 624, 627 (N.D. Tex. 1937).
87. See La. State Lottery Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 15 F. Cas. 970, 980-81 (C.C.D. La. 1879) (No.
8541).
88. See Am. Historical Soc. v. Glenn, 162 N.E. 481,483 (N.Y. 1928).
89. See Coleman v. United States, 715 F.2d 1156, 1157 (7th Cir. 1983).
90. Curry v. District of Columbia, 14 App. D.C. 423, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1899).
An Ohio Supreme Court Justice, convinced that the Declaration must somehow be relevant but
not sure precisely why, simply included the entire Declaration of Independence in a dissenting
opinion in a recent train accident case. See Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 662
N.E.2d 287, 308-10 (Ohio 1996) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Black once suggested
that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment violated at
least four of the Declaration's charges against the king. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379,407 n.7
(1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
91. For example, the Supreme Court's recent sovereign immunity decisions seem implicitly to
assume that the states were once thirteen independent nations. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
712 (1999) (holding that Congress may not subject a state to suit in its own courts without the
state's consent); Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
687 (1999) (holding that states are immune from suit under the Trademark Remedy Clarification
Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999)
(holding that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce and Patent
Clauses and establishing strict requirements for abrogation under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (holding that Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce clause).
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incoherent and contradictory, and the Supreme Court has done nothing
to clarify it.
The Declaration states that "these United Colonies are, and of Right
ought to be, Free and Independent States ... and that as Free and
Independent States, they have full power.., to do all ... Acts and
Things which Independent States may of right do." A number of courts
have reasoned that the Declaration thereby created thirteen sovereign
nations.92 Chief Justice Taney adhered to this view, arguing that "by the
Declaration of Independence, [the colonies had] become separate and
independent sovereignties, against which treason might be committed."93
However, in a 7-1 decision in 1936, the Supreme Court articulated a
different conclusion, stating that as a result of the Declaration of
Independence, "the powers of external sovereignty passed from the
Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America." 4 The
Second Circuit echoed this view in a recent case, noting that
beginning with the Declaration of Independence ... the member
states had no more power to make war or enter into treaties of
peace or alliance than they had had as colonies under the British
Crown. The Articles of Confederation appear merely to have
92. See, e.g., Day v. Buffinton, 7 F. Cas. 222, 227 (C.C.D- Mass. 1871) (No. 3675) (observing
that the states "existed as independent sovereignties ... from the date of the Declaration of
Independence until the articles of confederation were ratified"); Robins Island Preservation Fund,
Inc. v. Southold Dev. Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1185, 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Gallamo v. Long, 243 N.W.
719, 724 (Iowa 1932); In re Phipps, 19 Mass. 394, 394 (1824); Seneca Nation of Indians v. Christy,
27 N.E. 275, 278 (N.Y. 1891); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 58 S.E.2d 766, 773 (W.Va.
1950) ("As every one knows, when the Declaration of Independence was adopted each of the
thirteen colonies became sovereign and independent states .... "); see also Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S.
(7 How.) 282, 293 (1849) (argument of D.B. Ogden); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539,
580 (1842) (argument of Attorney Hambly); State Bank of Ohio v. Knoup, 6 Ohio St. 342, 394
(1856) (Bartley, C.J., dissenting); cf Rumsey v. N.Y. & New England R.R., 17 N.Y.S. 672, 675
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1892) (suggesting that the Declaration transferred sovereignty to the people of each
state).
93. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 101 (1861); see also GARRY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 332 (1978) ("Not one country,
but thirteen separate ones, came into existence when the Declaration was at last made unanimous on
July 19, 1776.").
94. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316 (1936); see also State ex
rel. Mills v. Dixon, 213 P. 227, 230 (Mont. 1923) (the states were "never in their individual
capacity strictly" sovereign); Maynard v. Newman, I Nev. 271, 273 (1865) (noting that the
Declaration of Independence was the act of "one nation, or one people"). The Curtiss-Wright
Court's holding that certain foreign affairs powers are inherent in the federal government is
criticized in Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973).
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confirmed, rather than to have originated, Congress' peace-treating
power.95
In all of these ways the Declaration is relevant to the world of law.
Although the Declaration is reproduced in the United States Code as part
of the "Organic Laws" of the United States, and although courts have
occasionally held or suggested that the Declaration is "law,"96 the
Declaration is not really "law" in the way that term is traditionally
understood.97 Rather, the best understanding of the Declaration is that it
is a legal document that has continuing significance in American law. As
the examples above have demonstrated, this significance is pervasive
and cuts to the core of some of our nation's most difficult legal issues. It
is therefore vitally important that we have a proper understanding of
what the Declaration of Independence actually accomplished, and of
what theories of government underlie it. It is to the first of those issues
that I now turn.
II. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE
CREATION OF AN AMERICAN NATION
This Part argues that the Declaration of Independence was the act of
one American people, creating an American nation. After the
Declaration, America presented itself as one nation to the world. Well
95. Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070, 1088 (2d Cir. 1982).
96. See, e.g., Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 214 n.2 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (stating that
the Declaration "has never been repealed, and, is valid and binding on all governments of the United
States, federal and state, as a primary obligation" and citing for support Lincoln's Gettysburg
Address and Second Inaugural as carved on the Lincoln Memorial); Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17,
30 (Cal. 1948) (Carter, J., concurring) ("The Declaration of Independence is a part of the law of our
land."); Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Union Say. Bank Co., 163 N.E. 221, 222 (Ohio Ct. App. 1928)
("[The] declaration is a part of the law of this state, as much so as its Constitution and statutes.").
Courts have often used legal metaphors to describe the Declaration. It has been termed a "charter
of our liberties," Cooper v. Hindley, 70 Wash. 331, 336, 126 P. 916, 919 (Wash. 1912); a "national
Magna Charta," State v. Cutshall, 15 S.E. 261, 263 (N.C. 1892); a statement of the "American
creed," Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring); and as "the Magna
Charta of our republican institutions," United States v. Morris, 125 F. 322, 325 (E.D. Ark. 1903).
97. Cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Declaration of
Independence... is not a legal prescription conferring power upon the courts."); Morehouse v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 1998 WL 320268, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 1998) ("The Declaration
of Independence does not directly create rights that can be enforced through the judicial system.");
City of Anniston v. Court of County Comm'rs, 48 So. 605, 605 (Ala. 1909) ("The Declaration of
Independence is in the printed volumes called the Code, and has been in the printed copies of every
previous Code; but, of course, it is not a part of the Code proper.").
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before the Articles of Confederation were even drafted, much less
ratified, the Continental Congress operated as a national government that
possessed all the powers of external sovereignty. What the Declaration
most certainly did not do was create thirteen separate nations,
completely independent of each other.
My argument, however, is not that the Declaration created a unitary
nation-state. If the definition of a nation is that of an entity with
exhaustive power over all subjects, and in which a majority can bind a
minority, we still do not live in an American nation. A minority of the
American people govern in the Senate, and, as we are too well aware, a
minority of the people can elect a President through the electoral college.
Likewise, there are a variety of subjects over which the federal
government has no constitutional authority to act.98 As James Madison
recognized, the Constitution of 1789 was "neither a national nor a
federal constitution; but a composition of both."99 The nation that was
formed on July 4, 1776, may best be described as some sort of
"confederate republic."' ° It held all the powers of external sovereignty,
although the details of its internal organization were less clear.
98. See e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked
authority to enact civil remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked authority to criminalize possession
of guns within the vicinity of schools).
99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 259 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
100. In the debates surrounding the Constitution, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists used
Montesquieu's term "confederate republic" to describe both the proposed government under the
Constitution and the old government under the Articles of Confederation. Douglas G. Smith, An
Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 249, 260 (1997).
In his speech to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, James Wilson stated:
The United States may adopt any one of four different systems. They may become consolidated
into one government, in which the separate existence of the states shall be entirely absorbed.
They may reject any plan of union or association, and act as separate and unconnected states.
They may form two or more confederacies. They may unite in one federal republick.
James Wilson, Speech Delivered on 26th November, 1787, at the Convention of Pennsylvania, in 2
THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 759, 766 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967). This suggests that
Wilson viewed both the Articles and the proposed Constitution as types of "federal republics," and
not as fundamentally different entities.
Alexander Hamilton, relying on Montesquieu, described a confederate republic as an
'assemblage of societies,' or an association of two or more states into one state." THE FEDERALIST
No. 9, at 122 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). According to Hamilton, "the
extent, modifications and objects of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion." Id. Thus,
for Hamilton, there was no fundamental difference in the nature of the union between the
government under the Articles of Confederation and the proposed Constitution.
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Nor do I argue that the states necessarily lacked the legal authority to
leave the American union after the Declaration. Article VII of the
Constitution, for example, certainly contemplates that individual states
might go their own way, and several of The Federalist Papers address
the fear that the union might split into three or four separate
confederacies. The important point is not so much when each state lost
its power to leave the Union, but when the Union legally acquired all the
great incidents of national sovereignty. These powers of sovereignty did
not arise from the Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781. Nor did
they arise from the Constitution of 1789. Although the Constitution
certainly created a "more perfect" American nation from an internal
perspective,'' it was almost entirely irrelevant from an external
perspective. By the time the Constitution was ratified, the Continental
Congress had a lengthy history of conducting wars, negotiating treaties,
governing vast federal territories, and adjudicating interstate disputes.0"
The states did none of these things, and made no attempt to do so. If a
state had wished to exercise any of the powers of external sovereignty, it
would have had to withdraw affirmatively from the American union and
declare itself a completely independent state.
In short, the Declaration was an act of all the American people,
creating an entity, the United States of America, which presented itself
as one nation to the world.0 3 This Part is dedicated to an exploration of
this theme. Section A offers a brief discussion of the interpretive method
employed in this Part and in Part Three. Sections B and C focus closely
on the Declaration's text. Section B considers the problem of the voicing
of the Declaration and argues that the American people as a whole
declared American independence. Section C addresses what sort of
entity or entities the Declaration created and argues that the Declaration
James Madison similarly pointed out that the states were regarded as "distinct and independent
sovereigns" under the new Constitution, and that the principles of the Constitution were essentially
an "expansion of principles which are found in the Articles of Confederation." THE FEDERALIST NO.
40, at 262 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
For an interesting discussion of the idea of a "compound republic" in the founding period, see
PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF NATIONS IN AN
AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814 (1993).
101. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J.
1425, 1456 (1987).
102. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (1979).
103. The Declaration apparently marks the first use of the term "United States of America." See
Edmund C. Bumett, The Name "United States ofAmerica,"31 AM. HIST. REV. 79, 79 (1925).
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created one American nation, at least with respect to the rest of the
world. Section D argues that ample historical evidence supports the
textual reading offered in Sections B and C.
A. A Preliminary Note on Method
The argument in the next two Parts will require a close attention to
the text of the Declaration. Despite the recent publication of several
important works on the Declaration,0 4 it remains true, as Gary Wills
pointed out twenty years ago, that the Declaration has not been subject
to the rigorous "construction" of legal analysis." 5 It has been too easy to
move quickly from the text of the Declaration to vague generalities
about the nature of liberty or into the subtleties of eighteenth-century
intellectual life. Yet the delegates to the Continental Congress knew they
were composing a document that would justify their actions to the ages,
and they accordingly spent an extraordinary amount of time editing
Thomas Jefferson's draft of the Declaration. They excised sections,
added new ones, and made minute adjustments to language.0 6 As
Pauline Maier has put it, "By exercising their intelligence, political good
sense, and a discerning sense of language, the delegates managed to
make the Declaration at once more accurate and more consonant with
the convictions of their constituents, and to enhance both its power and
104. Pauline Maier's splendid historical account of the Declaration, MAIER, supra note 3, will
remain the standard work in the field for decades to come. Jay Fliegelman has published a
compelling study of the Declaration's relation to late-eighteenth-century rhetorical culture. See JAY
FLIEGELMAN, DECLARING INDEPENDENCE: JEFFERSON, NATURAL LANGUAGE, AND THE CULTURE OF
PERFORMANCE (1993). The important work of Stephen Lucas combines historical and rhetorical
approaches to the Declaration. See Stephen E. Lucas, Justifying America: The Declaration of
Independence as a Rhetorical Document, in AMERICAN RHETORIC: CONTEXT AND CRITICIsM 67
(Thomas W. Benson ed., 1989) [hereinafter Lucas, Justifying America]; Stephen E. Lucas, The
Rhetorical Ancestry of the Declaration of Independence, I RHETORIC & PUB. AFFAIRS 143 (1998).
John Philip Reid, The Irrelevance of the Declaration, in LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
AND THE REVOLUTION IN LAW (Hendrik Hartog ed., 1981), argues that the Declaration is primarily
addressed to British constitutional issues. None of these works, however, speak directly to the legal
aspects of the Declaration.
Garry Wills's controversial Inventing America, supra note 93, relates Jefferson's draft of the
Declaration to the trans-Atlantic intellectual world of the Enlightenment. Although many of Wills's
observations continue to be useful, his conclusion that Jefferson's primary intellectual debt was to
the Scottish Enlightenment has not withstood scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Ronald Hamoway,
Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills's Inventing America:
Jefferson's Declaration of Independence, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 503 (1979).
105. WILLS, supra note 93, at xxv.
106. See MAIER, supra note 3, at 143-50.
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its eloquence."' 7 Thus, it is important that we pay careful attention to
the precise language the Congress employed-and not just in the famous
second paragraph, but also in the more substantial charges against the
King. As contemporaries recognized, these charges were the heart of the
document, the legal basis that justified revolution.'
A focus on the text of the Declaration requires, of course, that we
have the correct text in front of us. There at least two documents with a
strong claim to being the "official" text of the Declaration, and they
differ from each other in caption, signature, capitalization, and
punctuation.0 9 The first text is the printing prepared by Philadelphia
printer John Dunlap at the direction of the Continental Congress on the
night of July 4, 1776. It was through this printing, known as the "Dunlap
broadside," that most Americans became acquainted with the
Declaration.' Congress sent copies of the Dunlap broadside to all of the
states, and ordered that it "be proclaimed in each of the United States,
and at the head of the army.""' The second text is the parchment copy
now on display at the National Archives. This copy was prepared
pursuant to a July 19, 1776, resolution of the Continental Congress, and,
unlike the Dunlap broadside, it includes the signatures of all the
delegates."' However, this parchment copy was effectively a secret
document, and it was not until January 18, 1777, after military success at
Trenton and Princeton, that Congress sent copies to the states." 3
The Dunlap broadside has the better claim to our attention. It is the
nearest text to the actual events of July 4, 1776. Moreover, as the widely
disseminated public version of the Declaration, it is the text that most
Americans came to know and celebrate. The subsequent publication
history of the Declaration unfortunately tended to blend elements of the
Dunlap broadside with elements of the parchment copy, with the result
107. Id. at 150. For this reason, it is proper to say that Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration,
but that the Continental Congress is its author.
108. MAIER, supra note 3, at 105. In the works of Harry Jaffa and Walter Bens, two scholars for
whom the Declaration is a fundamental source of constitutional principles, the charges against the
King seldom, if ever, make an appearance. See BERNS, supra note 18; JAFFA, supra note 46. The
same can be said of Scott Gerber's recent work on the Declaration. See GERBER, supra note 46.
109. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 16 n.26 (1950).
110. MAIER, supra note 3, at 130-31, 159.
111. Id. at 130.
112. Id. at 150-51.
113. Id. at 153.
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that many modem printings of the Declaration confuse elements of the
two texts.114 For the purposes of this Article, I will rely on the Dunlap
broadside as the authoritative text and refer to the parchment only for
secondary points. For the reader's convenience, the Dunlap broadside is
reproduced in the Appendix.
This Article employs many of the interpretive devices that Akhil
Amar describes as "intratextualism.""' 5 Intratextualism is specifically
concerned with how words and phrases in a document interact with and
illuminate each other. 1 6 As Amar puts it, intratextualism allows us to
"squeeze more meaning" from a document than would an interpretive
method that is strictly clause-bound."' In a thoughtful article, Robert
Spoo has observed that Amar's brand of intratextualism has an important
aesthetic component and is a legal counterpart to the New Criticism that
flourished in literary studies in the 1940s and 50s.118 Aesthetic
114. In 1781, the Continental Congress followed the Dunlap broadside in a collection of
government documents. See UNITED STATES CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
SEVERAL INDEPENDENT STATES OF AMERICA 187 (Philadelphia, Bailey 1781). But this edition also
included the signatures of the delegates, which appear only on the parchment copy. See id. at 191-
92. Whether intentional or not, Congress's edition thus conflated the parchment and the broadsides,
an error that would be repeated in later privately printed collections. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE SIXTEEN STATES WHICH COMPOSE THE CONFEDERATED REPUBLIC OF AMERICA 5, 9-10
(Newburgh, N.Y., David Denniston 1800).
The Dunlap broadside is reprinted in JULIAN P. BOYD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE:
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TEXT 78 (1945), and is transcribed in DUMBAULD, supra note 109, at 157-
61. The parchment copy is transcribed in CARL L. BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
185-93 (1922).
115. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747 (1999).
116. See id. at791-95.
117. Id. at 826-27.
118. See Robert Spoo, "No Word is an Island": Textualism and Aesthetics in Akhil Reed Amar 's
The Bill of Rights, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 537, 573-76 (1999). Christopher Eisgruber has suggested
that this sort of interpretation can quickly lead to what he terms the "Aesthetic Fallacy," that is, the
belief that "the Constitution is like a poem, a symphony, or a great work of political philosophy,"
and that "[e]ach word and every phrase must come together to form a harmonious and pleasing
composition." Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Living Hand of the Past: History and Constitutional
Justice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1617 (1997). A similar point is made in Adrian Vermeule &
Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L.
REv. 730, 770 (2000) Of course, taken to extremes, any form of constitutional interpretation can
become ridiculous, as Amar well recognizes. See Amar, supra note 115, at 799 ("Carried to
extremes, intratextualism may lead to readings that are too clever by half."). The solution, of course,
is not abandonment of an interpretive method, but rather the use of good judgment in its
application.
The connection between legal and literary interpretation has a durable pedigree. For example,
James Wilson, a principal architect of the Constitution, signer of the Declaration, and Justice of the
Supreme Court, observed in his 1793 opinion in Chishohn v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 454
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sensibilities are even more useful in interpreting the Declaration of
Independence, a self-consciously rhetorical document, than they are for
the Constitution, and much of my interpretation will be conducted in the
spirit of the New Critics. My goal, though, is not simply to offer a
pleasing and elegant interpretation of the Declaration. Unlike the New
Critics, an interpreter of the Declaration cannot consider the text in
splendid isolation from the historical reality that surrounds it. The
challenge is to provide an interpretation that makes sense historically
and that conforms to the best understanding of what contemporaries took
the Declaration to mean. Accordingly, I often turn to historical evidence
to demonstrate the soundness of my interpretations.
B. Who Declared American Independence?
The first question to ask of any declaration is, "Who is doing the
declaring?" That is, in whose voice does the document purport to speak?
For the Declaration of Independence, this is a surprisingly difficult
question to answer. In its voicing, the Declaration is a rhetorical mirror
of the Constitution. The first paragraph of the Constitution begins in the
first person ("We the People of the United States")," 9 but then shifts
abruptly to the third person ("All legislative powers herein granted") 120
and remains in the third person for the rest of the document. The voicing
of the Declaration is exactly the reverse. It opens in the third person
("When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one
People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with
another"), but then shifts abruptly to the first person ("We hold these
truths to be self-evident") and remains in the first person for the rest of
the document. The insistent use of the first person is one of the
Declaration's most conspicuous rhetorical devices:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident ....
(1793), "[fIor, in an instrument well drawn, as in a poem well composed, silence is sometimes most
expressive." (The text in the U.S. Reports is corrupt at this point. For the correct text, see 5 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 196 (Maeva Marcus ed.,
1994)).
Vermeule and Young raise the additional criticism that judges are intellectually and practically ill-
equipped to carry out the intratextualist project. See Vermeule & Young, supra, at 759-77.
Whatever the force of this argument as an empirical description of judicial competence, it does not
detract from, and arguably justifies, the continuation of the intratextualist project in the academy.
119. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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He has kept among us... Standing Armies, without the
consent of our Legislatures ....
He has . . . subject[ed] us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our
Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws ....
For quartering large Bodies of Armed Troops among us:
For cutting off our Trade with all Parts of the World:
For imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:
For depriving us... of... Trial by Jury:
For transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended
Offences ....
For taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable
Laws and altering fundamentally the Forms of our
Governments ....
Nor have we been wanting in Attentions to our British
Brethren.
We have warned them ....
We have reminded them ....
We have appealed to their native Justice ....
[W]e have conjured them ....
We must, therefore, acquiesce ....
We ... Declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right
ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES ....
[W]e mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes,
and our sacred Honor.'2 '
The Declaration is far from explicit, though, about precisely to whom
or to what this pronoun "we" refers. What noun should we read into its
place? The text admits of at least four possibilities. First, it may refer to
the American states. Second, it may refer to the delegates to the




states as separate political entities. Finally, it may refer to the American
people acting as a whole. The following Subsections evaluate the
arguments in favor of each of these alternatives, and conclude that the
best reading is that "we" refers to the American people as a whole."
1. The States
The best argument for a "We, the states" reading of the Declaration is
based on the caption to the parchment copy. This heading describes the
Declaration as "The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States
of America."'" Certainly this seems like powerful evidence that the
Declaration is purporting to speak in the voice of the states, a conclusion
which finds some support in other parts of the text. For example, the
Declaration accuses George III of sending "Swarms of Officers to
harrass our People," and of destroying "the Lives of our People." The
phrase "our People" most plausibly implies the voice of a state.
Representatives might use this phrase, but it makes little sense for the
people themselves, either in states or in the aggregate, to refer to "our
people."
The bulk of the text, however, dramatically undermines a "We, the
states" reading, and reveals the sheer implausibility of the caption to the
parchment copy. The Declaration repeatedly uses the third person to
refer to the states. For example: "Such has been the patient sufferance of
these Colonies; and such is now the Necessity which constrains them to
alter their former Systems of Government"; 24 "the Establishment of an
122. Another possibility is that there is no consistent subject in the Declaration, and that the
meaning of the first person pronouns changes from sentence to sentence. Such a lurching quality is
inconsistent with everything we know about the effort that went into drafting the Declaration, see
MAIER, supra note 3, at 97-153, and is so highly unlikely that it does not merit further discussion.
123. BECKER, supra note 114, at 185.
124. This intriguing phrase might also be pointed to by a defender of a "We, the States" reading.
The use of the term "Necessity" relates the phrase back to the preamble ("it becomes necessary for
one people"), and thus links "these Colonies" with the act of separation. An important distinction
must be made, however, between creating new state governments and effecting independence from
Britain. On May 10, 1776, the Continental Congress recommended that the states form new
governments, a step which marked the beginning of state constitution-making. 4 JOURNALS OF THE
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, 342 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1906). Although this had
many of the practical effects of a declaration of independence, it did not formally sever the
connection with Britain. It is this process of state-level constitution-making to which the
Declaration refers with the phrase "such is the Necessity which constrains them [the Colonies] to
alter their former Systems of Government." The reference is to a process that is already occurring,
not to the formal act of separation that the Declaration effects.
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absolute Tyranny over these States"; "HE has endeavoured to prevent
the Population of these States"; "introducing the same absolute Rule into
these Colonies"; "as Free and Independent States, they have full Power
to .... 2' Likewise, in many places a "We, the states" reading is
nonsensical: "For depriving us [the states], in many Cases, of the
Benefits of Trial by Jury"; "For transporting us [the states] beyond Seas
to be tried for pretended Offences." Nor can states really pledge "to each
other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."'126
So why does the parchment copy claim that the Declaration is "The
Unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of America?" The
original caption, which was widely disseminated in the first printed
broadsides of the Declaration, read, "A Declaration by the
Representatives of the United States of America in General Congress
Assembled." There is no direct evidence of why the Continental
Congress ordered this change when it directed the preparation of the
parchment copy. However, the change is most likely a result of the
peculiar circumstances surrounding the Declaration's adoption. New
York initially abstained from voting for independence, and its delegates
were not given permission to approve the Declaration until a week after
its adoption."7 By this time, however, the text of the Declaration had
already been issued. The Congress almost certainly wanted to emphasize
the unanimity of the states in some fashion on the new parchment copy.
However, since the body of the Declaration's text could not be readily
altered, the only real alternative was to tinker with the caption. One
option would have been simply to insert the word "unanimous": "The
Unanimous Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of
America .... " But that was not strictly accurate, as two delegates
abstained from voting.'28 The only real option was to say something
about a unanimous declaration of the states, even if that meant directly
contradicting the voicing of the Declaration's text.
Rhetorical considerations may also have played a role. The initial
phrasing, "A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of
125. (emphasis added).
126. But see WILLS, supra note 93, at 340 ("These new states pledge to each other their honor,
that honor accruing to sovereignties as they take their 'free and equal station' with other nations.").
Although this might perhaps explain how states could have "honor," a traditionally personal virtue,
Wills does not explain why states would pledge to each other their "lives," nor does he address the
many other places in which a "we, the states" reading is simply implausible.




America in General Congress Assembled," is a bit clumsy, piling clause
upon clause (by... of... of... in) to no real effect. The opening
indefinite article is weak and does nothing to distinguish this declaration
from any other the Congress might issue. That the representatives are in
"General Congress Assembled" conveys a legalistic point about the
legitimacy of the Declaration, but has little rhetorical power. The altered
caption is shorter and more direct: "The unanimous Declaration of the
thirteen united States of America." This emphasizes the critical point of
unanimity, a point heightened by the resonance between the words
"unanimous" and "united."
Nonetheless, the parchment caption is wildly misleading as a
description of the Declaration's text. The states are simply not the active
voice in the Declaration. The delegates may have recognized this in the
change from "A Declaration by" to "The Unanimous Declaration of."
"By" implies agency; "of' has a more passive connotation." 9 The
Declaration may be "of' the thirteen states, without really being "by"
them.
Rhetorical considerations also explain the two uses of the phrase "our
people," which most strongly suggest the voice of the states. In both
instances, a plural first person pronoun would have been awkward and
inappropriate in a document that was meant to be read aloud. The
formulation, "He has.., sent hither Swarms of Officers to harrass us"
would be an ungainly tongue-twister. "Harrass our People" is much
better. Likewise, only someone with a tin ear for language would write,
"He has plundered our Seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our Towns, and
destroyed our Lives." Not only do persuasive documents rarely purport
to speak from beyond the grave, the rhythm of this clause demands a
longer concluding phrase. Again, "destroyed the Lives of our People" is
much better.
2. The Delegates to the Continental Congress
A more plausible argument can be made that the persistent "we" of
the Declaration is the voice of the delegates to the Continental Congress.
The Declaration concludes with the majestic phrase, "we mutually
129. Jay Fliegelman has insightfully discussed the Declaration's dichotomous approach to
agency. The Declaration repeatedly portrays the colonists' actions as "impelled" by "necessity," but
portrays George Ill as possessing absolute will ("He has .... He has .... He has....'). See
FLIEGELMAN, supra note 104, at 140-64. The modified caption is a good example of Fliegelman's
general point.
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pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our Sacred Honor." On
the parchment copy, the delegates signed their names immediately
beneath this phrase. Moreover, in the one place in which the Declaration
provides a clear appositive phrase for the pronoun "we," it identifies the
pronoun with the delegates: "WE, therefore, the Representatives of the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS,
Assembled... ." This echoes the caption to the Dunlap broadside: "A
Declaration By the Representatives of the United States of America, In
General Congress Assembled."
These arguments, although forceful, are not ultimately persuasive.
The identification of "we" with the delegates is restricted by a critical
modifying phrase: "WE, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS, Assembled... do, in
the Name of, and by the Authority of the good People of these Colonies,
solemnly Publish and Declare...."130 The key phrase is "in the Name
of." In this context, "in the Name of," is not simply rhetorical reiteration
of "by the Authority of."'31 Rather, it states that the Declaration is the
Declaration of "the good People of these Colonies." This clause
specifically names the voice that has been speaking throughout. The
Declaration was not made in the "Name of' the delegates, but of the
"good People of these Colonies."
Moreover, identifying the delegates as the "we" of the Declaration is
inconsistent with both the preamble of the Declaration and the theory of
popular sovereignty that the Declaration lays down in its famous second
paragraph. The preamble states, "WHEN in the Course of human Events,
it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands
which have connected them with another.., a decent Respect to the
Opinions of Mankind, requires that they should declare the causes which
impel them to the Separation."'3 This sentence is immediately followed
by the first use of the pronoun "We": "We hold these Truths .... " The
implication could not be more clear. The voice that announces itself in
the second paragraph is the voice of the one people who are required by
"a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind" to issue a declaration
130. (emphasis added).
131. For example, the Constitution twice employs the phrase "ordain and establish," but it is
unlikely that any meaningful distinction is intended between "ordaining" and "establishing." U.S.
CONST. pmbl. & art. III, § 1. Likewise, the Declaration refers to both "the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God," a rhetorical flourish that is certainly not intended to suggest the existence of two




justifying independence. Of course, practicality will dictate that such a
declaration be made through representatives, but that does not make it
any less a declaration by the people.
This interpretation is bolstered by the political theory of the second
paragraph, which states "that whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter
or to abolish it.' 33 In other words, it is the people, and only the people,
who have the right to overthrow a government. Independence from
Britain could only be effected by the people themselves; thus, it is
entirely appropriate that the document justifying the exercise of this
right be in the voice of the people.1
34
3. One People or Many?
Determining that the Declaration is in the voice of "the good People
of these Colonies" only partly resolves the issue. What does "good
People" mean in this context? Does it mean the people of each colony
acting in their capacity as members of that colony, or does it refer to the
American people en masse? I believe that the best interpretation is that
the voice is that of all the American people, acting together, to announce
themselves as "one people," at least with respect to the rest of the
world.13
5
We can best approach this subject by recognizing that the term
"people" had a very distinct meaning in the eighteenth-century. To the
twentieth-century ear, "people" often suggests the undifferentiated mass
of mankind.'36 The Continental Congress, by contrast, would have
understood the term as applying only to members of a distinct political
community. This long-standing sense of the term is captured in the first
definition offered in the Oxford English Dictionary: "A body of persons
133. (emphasis added).
134. Stephen Lucas identifies another reason for rejecting a "We, the delegates" reading. He
notes that the Declaration's statement, "In every stage of these Oppressions we have Petitioned for
Redress in the most humble Terms," clearly refers to events that happened before the Continental
Congress convened in 1774, which suggests that "we" refers to the colonists in general. Lucas,
Justifying America, supra note 104, at 109.
135. This point is a corollary to the arguments advanced in Part II.B, which describe the
Declaration as creating one American nation, at least with respect to the rest of the world.
136. See 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 505 (1989) (noting "men or women indefinitely"
as sixth definition of"people").
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composing a community, tribe, race or nation." 137 The Declaration
employs the term "people" in this sense. When the Declaration refers to
other groups of individuals, it uses different terms and uses them
precisely: "Men," "mankind," and "human," refer to all persons
throughout the earth; the term "inhabitant" refers to any person who
happens to be within a particular geographical area.
The preamble states, "WHEN in the Course of human Events, it
becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which
have connected them with another.., a decent Respect to the Opinions
of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel
them to the Separation."' 38 Here the Declaration clearly distinguishes
"one People" from "another" people (the British) and from the larger
"Mankind" to whom independence must be justified. This distinction is
amplified in the second paragraph: "WE hold these Truths to be self-
evident, that all Men are created equal... that to secure these Rights,
Governments are instituted among Men... [and] it is the Right of the
People to alter or abolish [a form of government that is destructive of
these ends]."' 39 The phrase "among Men" echoes the preamble's phrase
"among the Powers of the Earth." In this context, "among" implies a
clear separation of entities, just as the Constitution allows Congress to
regulate commerce "among the several States."'40 By instituting
governments, "Men" divide themselves into "Peoples." It is these
"People," not "Men" in general, who have the right to alter their form of
government.' 4 ' While all men can claim the "inalienable rights" of "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," only members of a particular
political community can exercise the more specific right of revolution.
Exercising this right meant that the British were no longer part of the
same "People" as the Americans, and accordingly the Declaration states
137. Id. at 504. It is noteworthy that the Oxford English Dictionary's principal definition of
"nation" is "[an extensive aggregate of persons, so closely associated with each other by common
descent, language, or history, as to form a distinct race or people, usually organized as a separate
political state and occupying a definite territory," thus reinforcing the connection between a
"people" and a "nation." 10 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 231 (1989) (emphasis added).
138. (emphasis added).
139. (emphasis added).
140. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
141. Similarly, the Declaration notes that, upon the suspension of colonial legislatures, the
"Legislative Powers, incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their
exercise," and that the king has refused to pass "Laws for the Accommodation of large Districts of
People." These are both unmistakable references to "people" in their distinctively political capacity.
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that the British will now be treated "as "the rest of Mankind, Enemies in
War, in Peace, Friends."' 42
The Declaration charges that British troops were protected "from
Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the
Inhabitants of these States," and that the King had "endeavoured to
bring on the Inhabitants of our Frontiers, the merciless Indian
Savages." ' The use of "Inhabitants" in the latter clause distinguishes
the Indians from the "People" who are exercising the right of revolution.
Similarly, the condemnation of George Il for murders committed on
"Inhabitants" includes a variety of persons who may not be full members
of the political community: children, Indian tribes friendly to the
colonial cause, and aliens temporarily resident in the United States.' 44
The special meaning of the term "people" is well-evidenced in the
Constitution of 1787, which carefully distinguishes between "people"
and "persons." The two instances of the term "people" both denote a
specific political group making a specific political choice. The preamble
states, "We, the People of the United States... do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America,""' and Article One
requires that "[House members shall be] chosen every second Year by
the People of the several States."'46 The Constitution employs the term
"Persons" to describe members of Congress ("the Names of Persons
voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal"'47) and to
describe candidates for the presidency (" [The electors] shall vote for
two Persons .... And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted
for" 48). Most notoriously, the term is used in calculating representation
142. (emphasis added).
143. (emphasis added).
144. The meaning of these terms is of more than antiquarian interest. In the 2000 presidential
election, voters unsuccessfully challenged the right of Texas electors to vote for both George W.
Bush and Richard Cheney, arguing that Cheney was not an "inhabitant" of another state, as required
under the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution. See Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D.
Tex. 2000). The court, incorrectly in my view, equated "inhabitant" with modem concepts of
domicile, tying it to the narrow issue of public assessments. The problem with the court's approach
is that it collapses the constitutionally distinct terms "citizen" and "inhabitant." The Eleventh
Amendment prohibits federal jurisdiction over suits between one of the United States and "Citizens
of another State." The framers of the Twelfth Amendment rejected the term "Citizen" when
formulating the restriction on voting in the electoral college, relying instead on the broader term
"inhabitant."
145. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
146. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
147. Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
148. Id. art. H, § 1, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
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in the House of Representatives: "by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons ... three fifths of all other Persons."'
' 49
So who are "the good People of these Colonies" in whose name the
Declaration speaks? I believe that they are one American people,
announcing their separation from the British people of whom they used
to be a part. 50 As Section lI.B argues, the Declaration created an
American nation. It thus makes eminent sense for the Declaration to
speak in the voice of the constituent members of that nation. The
American people that effect this change are a "People," in the distinct
sense of members of a political community. This sense is aptly captured
in the Declaration's opening lines: "WHEN in the Course of human
Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political
Bands which have connected them with another .... ,"'' The phrase
"one people" is singular. It is not only that the Americans are united into
"one"; they are united into one people. It is this one aggregate body-
this one People-that now rises to assert independence from Britain.
The singular sense of "one People" is reiterated when the Declaration
asserts that George I is "unfit to be the Ruler of a free People."'112
Interestingly, the delegates did not sign the parchment copy of the
Declaration as representatives of states; their signatures (unlike those of
the Constitution) are undifferentiated and random.'53 Indeed, as if to
149. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added).
150. Prior to the revolution, few Americans would have doubted that they and the British were
part of one people. For example, the New York Committee of Correspondence had resolved on July
19, 1774:
That we are one people, connected by the strongest ties of affection, duty, and interest, and that
we lament as the greatest misfortune, every occurrence which has the least tendency to alienate
or disturb that mutual harmony and confidence, which, if properly cultivated, could not fail
rendering the British empire the admiration and envy of all the world.
Proceedings of the Committee of Correspondence, July 19, 1774, PA. GAZETTE, July 27, 1774
(emphasis added). The Declaration itself refers to "our British Brethren" and to the "Ties of our
common Kindred."
151. (emphasis added).
152. (emphasis added). In Jefferson's draft, the phrase was "a people who mean to be free";
Congress's tightening of the phrase increased its rhetorical power. See MAIER, supra note 3, at 147.
Congress did not, however, change the singular to a plural-powerful evidence that the singular
represents a conscious congressional choice.
153. This point is obscured by some printed editions of the Declaration that insist on grouping
the delegates by state and inserting the name of their state as a heading. Although such alterations
perhaps bring clarity to the document, and render its form closer to that of the Constitution, they
nonetheless wreak editorial violence on the text. For the signatures as they actually appear on the
parchment copy, see BECKER, supra note 114, at 192-93.
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emphasize the unitary nature of the American people, the Declaration
never mentions any state by name.
This reading best makes sense of the Declaration's text. The
Declaration is clearly not in the voice of the states or of the delegates to
the Continental Congress. Nor can it comfortably sustain the proposition
that it refers to thirteen independent peoples completely separating
themselves both from each other and from the larger people of which
they were once a part. The historical sources in Section Il.C confirm that
this reading is not simply a modem contrivance, but is amply supported
by contemporary evidence.
B. What Kind ofIndependence Did They Declare?
The second part of the textual puzzle is to determine precisely what
sort of legal change the Declaration effected. Plausible arguments might
be made that the Declaration created one unitary nation-state, or that it
created thirteen separate nations, completely independent of each other.
The best reading of the text, however, is that the Declaration created a
union of states, a confederated republic, which stood as one nation with
respect to the rest of the world. It was the Declaration, not the Articles of
Confederation or the Constitution, that initially united the colonies and
gave birth to an American nation.
The debate, to the extent there is one, revolves primarily around this
passage from the final paragraph of the Declaration:
We... solemnly Publish and Declare, That these United Colonies
are, and of Right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES;
that they are absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown,
and that all political Connection between them and State of Great-
Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as FREE AND
INDEPENDENT STATES, they have full Power to levy War, conclude
Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other
Acts and Things which INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do.
From this language it is easy to conclude that the Declaration created
thirteen independent states. 54 After all, it refers to "Free and
Independent States," not to one nation. And the passage strongly
suggests that each state individually has the right to do all things which
"Independent States" may of right do.
154. See, e.g., supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
Washington Law Review
This conclusion is much too quick, and the passage cannot support the
weight that the thirteen nations argument would place on it. In its final
paragraph, the Declaration declares "these United Colonies" to be "Free
and Independent States." 155 Elsewhere, the Declaration simply refers to
"these Colonies." Yet here, the Declaration reiterates that the Colonies
are united. Although the Declaration refers to the colonies as "Free and
Independent," in context this simply means that the colonies are free and
independent of Great Britain; it does not at all follow that they are
independent of each other. Interestingly, the Declaration never once
applies the term "sovereign" to the states, and the passage most
suggestive of state sovereignty is capable of an alternate reading. "They"
(these Colonies), the Declaration claims, have "full Power to levy War,"
and so on. But if the Declaration meant to create thirteen independent
states, a much better formulation would have been that "each" has the
"full Power to levy War," and so on. In this context, "they" is
ambiguous, and even restrictive. For example, one might say of members
of the House of Representatives, "they have the power to impeach the
President of the United States," but no one would interpret that phrase as
meaning that any individual member of the House has the power to
impeach the President. They can only operate as a group; likewise, the
Declaration most plausibly means that they (the colonies) can only levy
war, and so on, as a group. It is surely of some significance that no state
ever individually asserted any of the powers to which the thirteen
nations argument would entitle them. No state on its own declared war;
no state on its own contracted Alliances; and no state on its own
established Commerce with foreign powers. Not one of the state
constitutions drafted after the Declaration said one word about war,
peace, or treaties." 6 It was clear that these powers belonged to the
Continental Congress, not to the states.
Twentieth-century orthography has blinded us to another powerful
piece of textual evidence in this passage. In formal writing of the late
eighteenth-century, nouns generally were capitalized; adjectives and
pronouns were not. " This rule is followed throughout the
155. (emphasis added).
156. See Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union Reconsidered: A Historical Refutation of
State Sovereignty over Seabeds, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1056, 1072 (1974).
157. See, e.g., THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN xli: JANUARY 1 THROUGH DECEMBER 31,
1768 (Leonard W. Labaree ed., 1959) (discussing Benjamin Franklin's insistence on capitalizing all
nouns). The Constitution displays such capitalization. For example, the Constitution repeatedly
refers to a "supreme Court," not to a "Supreme Court." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; art. III, § 1;
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Declaration."' The adjective/noun rule, for example, is evident in
"separate and equal Station, .... unalienable Rights," "light and transient
Causes," "absolute Despotism," "former Systems," "direct Object,"
"public Records," "manly Firmness," "pretended Legislation,"
"undistinguished Destruction," and "native Justice." The pronoun rule is
evident in phrases such as "they should declare," "they are endowed,"
"alter or abolish it," and "neglected to attend to them." The
adjective/noun rule is seemingly violated only in twelve places, five of
which occur in the Declaration's final passage. These five are "General
Congress, Assembled," "Supreme Judge of the World," "United
Colonies," and, twice, "Free and Independent States." The other seven
are "Political Bands," "Legislative Bodies," "Representative Houses,"
"Legislative Powers," "Judiciary Powers," "Standing Armies," and
"Armed Troops." Yet these anomalies can be explained quite simply.
These adjectives function not as separable adjectives, but as integral
parts of the nouns themselves. In context, all of these noun phrases
describe particular entities. A modem example might help illustrate the
point. We do not capitalize "cuckoo clock," but if nouns were required
to be capitalized, the phrase would appear as "Cuckoo Clock."
This evidence from elsewhere in the Declaration explains the
significance of the capitalized phrases "United Colonies" and "Free and
Independent States." They must be read as complete noun phrases, not as
nouns modified by adjectives. Thus the "United Colonies" are a distinct
entity, not merely a group of colonies who happen to be united. The
Declaration creates an entity, 'Tree and Independent States," not States
that happen to be free and independent. These 'Tree and Independent
States" are an entity as surely as the "United States of America" of
art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Although the capitalization rule has disappeared from modem English, it remains
the rule in modem German.
158. In only three places does the Declaration fail to capitalize a noun: the word "causes" in the
preamble, the word "consent" in the charges, and the word "act" in the conclusion to the charges. I
can think of no logical reason for failing to capitalize these nouns; each appears capitalized
elsewhere in the Declaration. This lapse is most likely an inadvertent oversight by the printer, who
may have carelessly construed these words as verbs.
The argument here rests on the Dunlap broadside. The parchment, by contrast, leaves many nouns
uncapitalized, see BECKER, supra note 114, at 191-92, a peculiarity that may reflect the personal
quirks of its preparer. However, the parchment does capitalize "Free and Independent States," and to
the extent that this secret document is relevant at all, see supra note 113 and accompanying text, it
does not undercut my argument.
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which the Constitution speaks.'59  Because we have lost the
understanding of capitalization that was common knowledge in the
eighteenth century, it is less obvious to us that the Declaration created an
American nation. Yet many people pointed to precisely this final passage
of the Declaration to support a nationalist reading. 6 It does not seem
implausible that capitalization played some role in their arguments.
The case for a nationalist reading of the Declaration's concluding
passage is bolstered by other passages in the document. Most telling is
the preamble: "WHEN in the Course of human Events, it becomes
necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have
connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the
Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God entitle them.... ." This passage describes the American
people as doing two distinct things. First, they are dissolving the
political bands which have connected them with another. This is
consistent with both the one-nation and the thirteen-nation argument.
Second, they are assuming a "separate and equal Station" among the
"Powers of the Earth." This language, however, is almost impossible to
reconcile with a thirteen-nation thesis. The people themselves are
asserting a claim to an equal station (note the singular form) as a
"Power[] of the Earth."'' This "one People" asserts equality with the
nations of the world. 62 It is hard to imagine a more striking endorsement
of the nationalist view. If the Declaration were creating thirteen
independent nations, it ought to say "separate and equal Stations."
Furthermore, the Declaration charges George III with constraining "our
fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against
their Country."'' 63 To what "Country" does this refer? Obviously, the
country cannot be Great Britain. It must refer to America as a whole, a
point nicely amplified in the phrase "fellow Citizens," which connects
Americans in all the states with the bonds of citizenship.
159. The Constitution specifically states that the United States is a singular entity when it extends
federal judicial power to controversies "to which the United States shall be a party." U.S. CONST.
art. 111, § 2, cl. I (emphasis added).
160. See Subsection HI.C.2, infra.
161. Cf Lucas, Justifying America, supra noie 104, at 82 ("' [T]he Laws of Nature and of
Nature's God' refers to the doctrine of eighteenth-century international law that all nations are by
nature 'free, independent, and equal' and entitled to the same rights and privileges.").
162. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see David Armitage, The Declaration of




Finally, it is worth noting that some of the language in the final
paragraph of the Declaration comes directly from Richard Henry Lee's
motion in the Continental Congress of June 7, 1776. Lee's motion stated,
"That these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and
independent States, that they are absolved from allegiance to the British
Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of
Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved." ' In debate, Lee
explained what he thought his motion would accomplish: "Let this
happy day give birth to an American Republic!"' 65 Lee clearly saw his
motion as creating a singular republic, not a multitude of independent
states. This view is reiterated in the Declaration that Congress ultimately
approved.
C. The Historical Evidence
The argument thus far has been grounded almost exclusively in the
text of the Declaration. Interpreting the Declaration as the act of one
American people creating an American nation best makes sense of the
Declaration's text and structure. But is such an interpretation grounded
in historical reality? Although the evidence is not unambiguous, there is
compelling historical support for this interpretation. This article does not
undertake an exhaustive survey of the historical sources and does not
aim to resolve conclusively any historical issues. Rather, I wish to
assuage doubts that my reading of the Declaration is somehow deeply
antithetical to its historical understanding.
Subsection One examines the understanding of the Declaration during
the Revolution itself. Subsection Two addresses the debates surrounding
the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. Subsection Three
considers Independence Day celebrations in the early republic.
Subsection Four analyzes the treatment of the Declaration in the earliest
reported judicial decisions. Subsection Five focuses on the seminal work
of Joseph Story, whose Commentaries on the Constitution address many
of the issues investigated in this Article. Subsection Six evaluates the
Articles of Confederation. Subsection Seven summarizes the main points
of this Section.
164. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 425 (Worthington Ford ed., 1906). Note the
change in the final version, which capitalized 'Tree" and "independent."
165. B.J. LOSSING, The Declaration of Independence Historically Considered, in LiVES OF THE
SIGNERS OF THE DECLARATION OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 244, 253 (Philadelphia, Evan,
Stoddart & Co. 1870).
Washington Law Review
1. The Declaration in the Throes of the Revolution
Pauline Maier has carefully traced how the momentum for
independence grew in towns and villages across America. 166 The
"authority" of the people of the United States that the delegates to the
Second Continental Congress invoked was firmly grounded in the
actions of these communities, in which the people themselves debated
and resolved the pressing issue of independence. 167 On May 27, 1776,
the town of Malden, Massachusetts, instructed its delegate that "it is
now the ardent wish of our soul that America may become a free and
independent state" and called for the creation of "an American
republic."' 168 Topsfield, Massachusetts, expressed its hope that Congress
would "declare America to be independent of the Kingdom of Great
Britain."'69 The Pennsylvania Provincial Conference declared its
willingness to "concur in a vote of the Congress declaring the United
Colonies free and independent States, provided the forming of the
Government, and the regulation of the internal police of this colony, be
always reserved to the people of the said Colony.' ' 70 This statement
clearly implies that a Declaration of Independence would effect the
creation of a new nation, with the states reserving power over their
internal affairs only.
That the Declaration had done precisely this was apparent from the
very beginning. On July 4, 1776, the Continental Congress appointed
Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson to design a great
seal for the United States America,'17 a truly odd assignment if the
Declaration had merely created thirteen independent nations. John
Hancock, President of the Continental Congress, sent copies of the
Declaration to the several states, observing, "The important
Consequences to the American States from this Declaration of
166. See MAIER, supra note 3, at 47-96.
167. See Morris, supra note 156, at 1069-71 (discussing the legitimacy of the Continental
Congress's claim to powers delegated directly from the people).
168. Resolution of the Town of Malden, Massachusetts, May 21, 1776, reprinted in THE SPIRIT
OF SEVENTY-SIX: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS TOLD BY PARTICIPANTS 297, 297-
98 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris, eds., 1975) [hereinafter SPIRIT OF SEVENTY-SIX].
169. Resolution of the Town of Topfield, Massachusetts, June 21, 1776, reprinted in MAIER,
supra note 3, at 233-234.
170. Declaration of the Pennsylvania Provincial Conference, June 24, 1776, reprinted in THE
SPARK OF INDEPENDENCE 147 (History Book Club 1997).




Independence, considered as the Ground & Foundation of a future
Government, will naturally suggest the Propriety of proclaiming it in
such a Manner, that the People may be universally informed of it."'"2
Ezra Stiles, who two years later would become President of Yale
College, received his copy of the Declaration on July 13, 1776. Upon
reading it, he declared, "Thus the CONGRESS have tied a Gordian knot,
which the Parliament will find they can neither cut nor untie. The
thirteen united Colonies now rise into an Independent Republic among
the kingdoms, states and empires on earth." 73 Savannah, Georgia,
celebrated the Declaration on August 10, 1776. The President and the
Council of Georgia read the Declaration in the Council chamber. 74 They
then proceeded to a square in front of the Assembly House and read the
Declaration "before a great Concourse of people."'75 They read the
Declaration again in front of the Georgia Battalion. 176 Finally, they
proceeded to the Battery and read the Declaration for a fourth time.
7
That evening the Council buried a representation of George IH and
roused the people with their understanding of what the now very familiar
Declaration meant: "America is free and independent; that she is, and
will be, with the blessing of the Almighty, great among the nations of the
earth."'17
8
The state constitutions adopted after the Declaration did nothing to
contradict this. None of these constitutions claimed any power over war
and peace or any other incident of national sovereignty. Indeed, ten of
these constitutions specifically prescribed methods for electing delegates
to the Continental Congress, an implicit recognition of Congress's
legitimacy and authority. 79
In a 1776 speech in the Continental Congress, Benjamin Rush, a
signer of the Declaration, noted that "We are now a new Nation," and
172. Letter from John Hancock to Certain States (July 6, 1776), in 4 LETrERS OF DELEGATES TO
CONGRESS 396 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1979).
173. 2 THE LITERARY DIARY OF EZRA STILES D.D., L.L.D., PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE 23-24
(Franklin Bowditch Dexter ed., 1901), reprinted in SPIRIT OF SEVENTY-SIX, supra note 168, at 322.






179. See Morris, supra note 156, at 1071.
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proclaimed himself a "Citizen of America."' 8 ° To Rush, it was clear that
the states were "dependent on each other-not totally independent
states."' 8' Rush's views were far from atypical. In 1777, before the
Articles of Confederation were even proposed to the states, much less
ratified, the Continental Congress, after a lengthy debate, found itself
equally divided on the issue of whether states had an inherent right to
meet with each other without the approbation of Congress.'82 If the
Declaration had simply created thirteen independent nations, that issue
should have been easily resolved.
In 1778, a writer to the Pennsylvania Gazette requested that the
newspaper republish the Declaration of Independence. The writer stated:
Too much cannot be said in Favour of this excellent Composition.
It is to the true Whig what the Bible is to the true Christian-it
contains his Right to the fair Inheritance of true Liberty. It cannot
be too much admired, nor too often read by every American .... In
order to excite the good People of the United States to a
Remembrance of their Birth into a world of Freedom [you are
requested to re-publish the Declaration].
For this writer, the Declaration was about the "birth" of the "People of
the United States." With the Declaration, the People of the United States
had announced themselves on the world stage.
Another writer in the Pennsylvania Gazette discoursed on the relation
between the states in 1780, at which point the Articles of Confederation
had not yet gone into effect. Maryland had enacted a law that, read
literally, seemed to prohibit the export of provisions from Maryland to
180. John Adams, Notes of Debates on the Articles of Confederation, in 2 THE ADAMS PAPERS:
DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 247-48 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1961).
181. Id. at 247. Peter Onufpoints out that after the Declaration, "The American states did not
behave as independent sovereignties were expected to behave; they did not act like true states."
PETER ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 3 (1983). With regard to territorial disputes,
"state sovereignty was identified not with the will to make and enforce claims but with claims that
could be made by right, and that should be upheld by all the states, individually and collectively."
Id. at7.
182. RAKOVE, supra note 102, at 165-66.
183. PA. GAZETTE, June 13, 1778. The phrase "Birth into a world of Freedom" foreshadows
similar natal imagery in Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address: "Four score and seven years ago
our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the
proposition that all men are created equal .... [We here highly resolve] that this nation, under God,
shall have a new birth of freedom." Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the
Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov. 19, 1863), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: GREAT SPEECHES 103-04 (John
Grafton ed., 1991) (emphasis added).
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the other states. 84 The writer defended the Maryland statute, arguing
that it could not possibly have such a meaning. Invoking the first line of
the Declaration of Independence, he argued:
We are but one people, from one end of the continent to the other (I
speak only of the United States) though under our respective forms
of government: The union, the confederacy, necessarily imply
mutual assistance and free intercourse and commerce.... An act of
any State to the purpose would be void in itself, as being against
the fundamental laws of the union. ... Every man knows that no
State can constitutionally enact a law contrary to the spirit of the
Union with the other States."'5
This writer recognized that the "one people" of America were largely
governed by their respective state governments, but he also recognized
that there were "fundamental laws of the Union" that the states could not
breach. Since the Articles were not yet in effect, he could have been
referring only to the Declaration of Independence or the nationalism that
it affirmed. If this proposition had been at all remarkable, it is doubtful
the writer would have claimed that "every man" knew it to be true.
A year earlier the Congress had officially asserted that it possessed
"the supreme sovereign power of war and peace." '86 This power gave
Congress the right "ultimately and finally to decide on all matters and
questions touching the law of nations." '87 Since the Articles of
Confederation had not yet gone into effect, the source of this power
could only be the Declaration of Independence.
In December of 1780, the Continental Congress affirmed the
importance of the Declaration to the governance of America by
appointing a committee "to collect and cause to be published 200 correct
copies of the declaration of independence, the articles of confederation
and perpetual union, the alliances between these United States and his
Most Christian Majesty, with the constitutions or forms of government
of the several states." '188 Were the Declaration simply the "propaganda
184. See PA. GAZ ErE, Feb. 9, 1780.
185. Id.
186. 13 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 283 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
187. Id. at 284. The Congress and its ambassadors in Europe also issued passports and oaths of
citizenship in the name of the United States. Morris, supra note 156, at 1087.
188. 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1217 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). The final
product was UNITED STATES CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 114. Subsequent collections of
the federal and state constitutions included the Declaration as their first document. See, e.g., THE
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statement" that later scholars have declared it to be, i"9 its inclusion in
this collection of governing documents would have been most
inappropriate.
2. The Debates Surrounding the Drafting and Ratification of the
Constitution
The Constitutional Convention and the subsequent ratification
struggle raised important questions about the relation between the states
and the union. These debates helped bring the Declaration into proper
focus, as both proponents and opponents of the new Constitution were
called on to explain just what the Declaration stood for.
The meaning of the Declaration was discussed in an important
exchange in the Constitutional Convention on June 19, 1787. In the
course of a debate about the scope of state authority, Massachusetts
delegate Rufus King observed that the states "were not 'Sovereigns' in
the sense contended for by some."' 90 They lacked the "peculiar features
of sovereignty, they could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor
treaties."' 9 ' A "Union of the States," King noted, "is a Union of the men
composing them, from whence a national character results to the
whole."' 192 If the states had "formed a confederacy in some respects-
they formed a Nation in others."' 93
Maryland's Luther Martin, who would become a virulent Anti-
Federalist, responded that the Declaration had authorized no such thing.
For Martin, the Declaration had "placed the 13 States in a state of Nature
towards each other" and created thirteen independent sovereignties."'
This notion was immediately denounced by James Wilson of
Pennsylvania, one of America's most brilliant lawyers and one of the
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SIXTEEN STATES WHICH COMPOSE THE CONFEDERATED REPUBLIC OF
AMERICA 5 (Boston, Manning & Loring 1797); THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SIXTEEN STATES, supra
note 114, at 5; THE FREEMAN'S GUIDE 3 (Charlestown, Solomon B. Brega 1812); CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW I (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1819).
189. See, e.g., HOFSTADTER, supra note 19, at 269.
190. Notes of James Madison, June 19, 1787, in 1787: DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION 1052
(Wilboum E. Benton ed., 1986) (remarks of Rufus King) [hereinafter DRAFTING THE
CONSTITUTION].
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1053.
193. Id.
194. Id. (remarks of Luther Martin).
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Convention's most able men. 95 Wilson, one of only six men to sign both
the Declaration and the Constitution, replied that Martin fundamentally
misunderstood what the Declaration meant. Wilson noted that the
Declaration of Independence preceded the state constitutions. 96 He
could "not admit the doctrine that when the Colonies became
independent of Great Britain, they became independent also of each
other." '197 Wilson read the Declaration of Independence and observed
that "the United Colonies were declared to be free and independent
States" and that they were "independent, not individually but
Unitedly."'98 Alexander Hamilton heartily agreed.' 99
Both Hamilton and Wilson expressed similar views outside the
Convention. In February of 1787, Hamilton explicitly tied the
Declaration to nationhood in a speech in the New York Assembly.
Hamilton read verbatim the sentence of the Declaration that declared the
United Colonies "free and independent states."2 ' To Hamilton, this
meant that
the union and independence of these states are blended and
incorporated in one and the same act; which taken together clearly,
imports, that the United States had in their origin full power to do
all acts and things which independent states may of right do; or in
other words, full power of sovereignty.2'
In the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, Wilson articulated a strong
nationalist view of the Declaration:
I consider the people of the United States, as forming one
great community; and I consider the people of the different states
as forming communities again on a lesser scale....
195. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 21
(1913).
196. Notes of Robert Yates, June 19, 1787, in DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 190, at
75 (remarks of James Wilson).
197. Notes of James Madison, June 19, 1787, in DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 190,
at 1053 (remarks of James Wilson).
198. Id. Wilson had made a virtually identical argument in a 1785 publication. See JAMES
WILSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BANK OF NORTH AMERICA, reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON 824, 829 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
199. Notes of James Madison, June 19, 1787, in DRAFTING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 190,
at 1053, 1057 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton).
200. Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on an Act Granting to Congress Certain Imposts and Duties
(Feb. 15, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 71, 77 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962).
201. Id.
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... I view the states as madefor the People, as well as by them, and
not the People as made for the states; the People, therefore, have a
right, whilst enjoying the undeniable powers of society, to form
either a general government, or state governments, in what manner
they please; or to accommodate them to another; and by this means
preserve them all; this, I say, is the inherent and unalienable right
of the people, and as an illustration of it, I beg to read a few words
from the Declaration of Independence, made by the representatives
of the United States and recognized by the whole Union.02
James Madison can likewise be counted among those with a
nationalist interpretation of the Declaration. In The Federalist No. 45, he
asked,
Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American
Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands
spilt ... not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty,
and safety, but that the government of the individual
States ... might enjoy a certain extent of power and be arrayed
with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty?2 3
For Madison, to ask the question was to answer it. Much later in life,
Madison conferred with Thomas Jefferson on the appropriate subjects of
study for the University of Virginia Law School. Madison's sketch of a
course outline began, "And on the distinctive principles of the
Government of our own State, and that of the U. States, the best guides
are to be found in-1. The Declaration of Independence, as the
fundamental act of Union of these States."' 4
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a signer of the Constitution, offered a
similar reading of the Declaration in the South Carolina convention in
1788. Pinckney argued, "[T]he Declaration of Independence...
sufficiently refutes the doctrine of the individual sovereignty and
202. James Wilson, Address in the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 472 (Merrill Jensen ed.,
1976). A history of the American Revolution published in 1789 noted that in the Declaration "the
Americans no longer appeared in the character of subjects in arms against their sovereign, but as an
independent people." 1 DAVID RAMSAY, THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 340-41
(Philadelphia, 1789), quoted in Philip F. Detweiler, The Changing Reputation of the Declaration of
Independence: The First Fifty Years, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 557, 564 (1962).
203. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
204. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 8, 1825), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 218, 221 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (emphasis added).
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independence of the several States."2 °" He noted, "The several States are
not even mentioned by name in any part, as if it was intended to impress
the maxim on America that our freedom and independence arose from
our union," and urged his colleagues to "consider all attempts to weaken
this union, by maintaining that each State is separately and individually
independent, as a species of political heresy."2 6
In The Federalist No. 2, John Jay stated:
To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people-each
individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same national rights,
privileges and protection. As a nation we have made peace and
war-as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies-as a
nation we have formed alliances and made treaties, and entered
into various compacts and conventions with foreign states.2"7
The text of the Constitution confirms the nationalist reading of the
Declaration of Independence that was offered during the ratification
debates. Article One of the Constitution requires Representatives to have
been citizens of the United States for seven years, and Senators to have
been citizens for nine years.20 8 Because the Constitution was drafted in
1787, these requirements logically require United States citizenship to
have existed in 1778. There must therefore have been an entity called the
United States of which an individual could be a citizen. If so, this status
would have nothing to do with the Articles of Confederation, which
were ratified in 1781, but could only be a result of the Declaration of
Independence. Indeed, that the Declaration created American citizenship
is clearly recognized in American law."9 Article Six of the Constitution
states that "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. 210
This means that treaties executed prior to the Constitution are valid and
binding. There is nothing to suggest that treaties made by the United
States prior to the Articles of Confederation would be excluded from this
clause. The United States entered into many treaties prior to the
205. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 150
(Boston, Little & Brown 1873) (1st ed. 1833) (quoting DEBATES IN SOUTH CAROLINA, 1788, at 43
(Charleston, A.E. Miller 1831)) [hereinafter 1 JOSEPH STORY].
206. Id.
207. THE FEDERALISTNo. 2, at 91-92 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 & art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
209. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
210. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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ratification of the Articles in 1781, and since treaties were traditionally
only entered into between sovereign nations, the clear implication is that
the United States, as one entity, possessed all the powers of external
sovereignty at least since the Declaration of Independence. Finally, it
was worth noting how the opening and closing phrases of the
Constitution evoke the Declaration of Independence. The phrase "We
the People" is not significantly different from the "one people" that
announces itself in the preamble to the Declaration. The Constitution
closes by citing the Declaration as a temporal reference point: "Done in
convention.., in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and
Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America
the Twelfth." ''
3. The Celebration of Independence Day
Fourth-of-July celebrations have seldom generated much interest
among legal scholars, yet they are a fascinating window into how early
Americans perceived the Declaration of Independence. Americans
celebrated the anniversary of the Declaration with energy and
enthusiasm beginning in 1777 and continuing until the present day. No
one celebrated the days on which the colonial legislatures had authorized
their congressional delegates to vote for independence; no one
celebrated July 2, the date Congress actually voted for independence; no
one celebrated the date of the ratification of the Articles of
Confederation; no one celebrated the dates of the signing or ratification
of the Constitution; no one celebrated the dates on which the new federal
government under the Constitution began operating. But Americans
consistently celebrated the anniversary of the Declaration, telling
evidence of the importance of the Declaration in the development of
American national identity.
The first anniversary of the Declaration in 1777 was celebrated with
cannon salutes, decorated navy ships, military parades, ringing church
211. Id. art VII.
Of course, Article VII also provides that the ratification of only nine states would be sufficient for
establishing the Constitution between those nine states. Although the Constitution does not specify
the status of a non-ratifying state, it presumably would have been free to go its own way. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 43, at 286 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (noting the "merely
hypothetical" prospect of non-ratifying states). This demonstrates not so much that the United States




bells and extravagant fireworks across the eastern seaboard.2" 2 One
Pennsylvania newspaper declared, "Thus may the fourth of July, that
glorious and ever memorable day, be celebrated through America, by the
sons of freedom, from age to age till time shall be no more., 21 3 By the
time of the drafting of the Constitution, the Fourth of July and the
Declaration had become tied to a strong sense of American national
identity. The Pennsylvania Herald observed in 1787 that the "auspicious
Fourth of July, which crowned the toils of America with freedom and
sovereignty has been commemorated in every district of the continent,
with the fullest demonstrations of joy and gratitude."2 4 The paper
expressed its hope that the Federal Convention would produce "a system
of government adequate to the security and preservation of those rights,
which were promulgated by the ever-memorable Declaration of
Independency."2 5 In 1788, the "largest, most lavish procession ever seen
in the United States" was held in Philadelphia on the Fourth of July.26
The "Grand Federal Procession," as it was called, was over a mile and
half long and involved over five thousand people.2 7 Intended as a
massive propaganda display on the part of Pennsylvania Federalists, the
procession pointedly linked the proposed new Constitution with the
celebration of the Declaration of Independence.2"8 The event ended with
a speech by James Wilson before a crowd of approximately 17,000
people.29 As Francis Hopkinson subsequently wrote to Thomas
Jefferson, "Nothing can equal the Rejoicings in the Cities Towns &
Villages thro'out the States on the late fourth of July in Celebration of
the Declaration of Independence & the Birth of the new Constitution."' o
212. See LEN TRAVERS, CELEBRATING THE FOURTH: INDEPENDENCE AND THE RITES OF
NATIONALISM IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 17-20 (1997).
213. Id. at 24 (quoting PA. EVENING POST, July 5, 1777).
214. PA. HERALD, July 14, 1787, reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 165 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 198 1).
215. Id.
216. TRAVERS, supra note 212, at 71.
217. Id. at 71-72.
218. Id. at 78.
219. Id. at 77. The speech was not a complete success. "Owing to some mistake, the cannon
began firing just as he began to speak, so that no one could understand anything he said." Id.
(quoting CHARLES BIDDLE, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CHARLES BIDDLE, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
SUPREME EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF PENNSYLVANIA 226 (Philadelphia, E. Claxton 1853)).
220. Letter from Francis Hopkinson to Thomas Jefferson (July 17, 1788), in 18 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 270, 271 (John P. Kaminski
& Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1995). One such celebration was in New Haven, Connecticut, where the
Declaration of Independence was read in a ceremony with "uncommon splendour." Id. at 235.
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When George Washington was attempting to discern the protocol
suitable to his new office as President of the United States, Alexander
Hamilton recommended limiting public entertainments, but insisted that
an entertainment be held on the "day of the Declaration of
Independence. 222
By 1791, people were referring to the Fourth of July as a "natal
day," 222 and, at least by 1815, it was common to speak of the Fourth as
"the National Birth Day., 223 Thomas Jefferson referred to Fourth of July
celebrations as "an anniversary assemblage of the nation on its
birthday," 2 4 and to the Fourth of July as "our nation's birthday. '225 As
Jefferson explained, the Declaration of Independence "made us a
nation. 2 2 6 In 1821, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams attended the
celebration of the Fourth of July in Washington, D.C. He read from the
original Declaration of Independence that was in the custody of the
Department of State, and observed,
The interest, which in this paper has survived the occasion upon
which it was issued; the interest which is of every age and every
clime; the interest which quickens with the lapse of years, spreads
as it grows old, and brightens as it recedes, is in the principles
which it proclaims. It was the first solemn declaration by a nation
of the only legitimate foundation of civil government.... It
announced in practical form to the world the transcendent truth of
the unalienable sovereignty of the people.227
This theme was echoed in the last letter Thomas Jefferson ever wrote.
Referring to the upcoming fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of
221. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (May 5, 1789), in 5 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 335, 336 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962).
222. INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, July 2, 1791, quoted in TRAVERS, supra note 212, at 110.
223. BOSTON GAZETTE, July 15, 1815, quoted in TRAVERS, supra note 212, at 4. In 1871,
Congress specifically declared that July 4, 1776, was the "birthday of the nation." Act of Mar. 3,
1871, ch. 105, 16 Stat. 470.
224. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 14, 1823), in JEFFERSON'S LETTERS
365, 366 (Willson Whitman ed., 1950).
225. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Ellen W. Coolidge (Nov. 14, 1825), in JEFFERSON'S
LETTERS, supra note 224, at 372-73.
226. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Oct. 24, 1823), in THE LIFE AND SELECTED
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 646 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1998).
227. JOHN QuINCY ADAMS, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE REQUEST OF A COMMITTEE OF THE
CITIZENS OF WASHINGTON, ON THE OCCASION OF READING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE




Independence, Jefferson stated, "May [the Declaration] be to the world
what I believe it will be... the signal of arousing men to burst the
chains under which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded
them to bind themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of
self-government."" 5 Jefferson urged, "let the annual return of this day
forever refresh our recollections of these rights, and an undiminished
devotion to them."'
In 1831, John Quincy Adams again spoke at a Fourth of July
ceremony and affirmed that the "declaration was joint, that the united
colonies were free and independent states, but not that any one of them
was a free and independent State, separate from the rest.""0 Rather, "The
Declaration of Independence announced the severance of the thirteen
united colonies from the rest of the British Empire, and the existence of
their people, from that day forth, as an independent nation."'
In all of these Fourth of July celebrations, Americans affirmed their
understanding of the Declaration as grounded in the inherent sovereignty
of the American people. They did not understand the Declaration as
having created thirteen independent nations; rather, the Declaration
marked the Americans' birth as a new people and as a new nation.
4. Early Court Cases
Further evidence of the role of the Declaration in establishing one
American nation can be found in the earliest decisions of American
courts. The cases, although not unambiguous, strongly suggest that
American courts recognized the Declaration as the act of one people
creating an American nation.
228. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger Weightman, June 24, 1826, quoted in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 665-66. Both Thomas Jefferson
and John Adams would die on July 4, 1826, the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of
Independence, a coincidence which Americans imbued with mystical significance. See TRAVERS,
supra note 212, at 220.
229. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger Weightman, supra note 226, at 666.
230. 1 JOSEPH STORY, supra note 205, at 150 n.3. (quoting John Adams).
231. Id. Justice Scalia recently echoed this view in his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992), where he describes the Declaration as "the document marking our birth as a separate
people." Id. at 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Scalia's description is similar to that of
Justice Bradley, who, in the Slaughter-House Cases, referred to the Declaration as "the first political
act of the American people in their independent sovereign capacity." Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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The first discussion of the Declaration in the Supreme Court appears
in Chief Justice Jay's opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia.2 In that case, the
Court unanimously held that Article III of the Constitution subjected
states to suit in federal court by citizens of another state. 33 Jay's opinion
addressed the legal effect of the Declaration of Independence:
The revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence, found
the people already united for general purposes, and at the same
time providing for their more domestic concerns by state
conventions, and other temporary arrangements. From the crown of
Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the people
of it; and it was then not an uncommon opinion, that the
unappropriated lands, which belonged to that crown, passed not to
the people of the colony or states within whose limits they were
situated, but to the whole people; on whatever principles this
opinion rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen
sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of
the revolution, combined with local convenience and
considerations; the people nevertheless continued to consider
themselves, in a national point of view, as one people; and they
continued, without interruption, to manage their national concerns
accordingly .... 234
Jay's opinion confirms the idea that the Declaration was a national act of
one people, creating one nation, at least with respect to "national
affairs."
The 1795 case of Penhallow v. Doane's Administrators35 raised the
issue of the status of the Declaration in even more pointed fashion. The
case arose out of a New Hampshire admiralty dispute dating back to
1777. In 1779 and 1783, the Continental Congress had asserted its
232. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
233. Id. at 424. This particular holding was altered by the ratification of the Eleventh
Amendment. But it is unlikely that the Supreme Court misinterpreted Article III. Two of the five
justices who heard the case, James Wilson and John Blair, had been delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, where Wilson took a leading role. Chief Justice John Jay was one of the authors of The
Federalist Papers, and Justice William Cushing had played a prominent part in the Massachusetts
ratifying convention. Although this is not the place to enter into the thicket of Eleventh Amendment
controversies, the best interpretation is that the Eleventh Amendment simply limits a particular class
of diversity cases, not federal question suits brought against states. See Amar, supra note 101, at
1474-75.
234. Chisholm, 2. U.S. (2 Dall.) at 470 (Jay, C.J.) (emphasis added).
235. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 54 (1795).
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power, through its Committee of Appeals, to review the earlier New
Hampshire state court decisions in the case.3 6 The 1795 proceedings
forced the Supreme Court to determine the validity of this jurisdiction,
and by extension, the powers of the Continental Congress prior to the
Articles of Confederation. Both parties were represented by
exceptionally able counsel, and oral arguments extended over eightdays. 237
The plaintiffs in error contended that the Continental Congress lacked
the power to review prize decisions of the state courts: "The colonies,
totally independent of each other before the war, became distinct,
independent states, when they threw off their allegiance to the British
crown, and congress was no longer a convention of agents for colonies,
but of ambassadors from sovereign states." ' The Declaration, they
contended, "made no difference as to the sovereignty of the several
States"; Congress was merely an advisory body and possessed only the
power to recommend. 9
The defendants in error vehemently challenged these assertions. As
they saw it, "On the declaration of independence, a new body politic was
created; congress was the organ of the declaration; but it was the act of
the people, not of the state legislatures, which were likewise nothing
more than organs of the people.""24 The Continental Congress had a
"national sovereignty" and derived its authority "from the whole people
of America, as one united body."24 The plaintiff s arguments, they
236. See 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800, 389 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1998).
237. See id. at 394.
238. Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 67-68. Justice Paterson's notes of the oral arguments confirm
that the appellants specifically linked this argument to the Declaration of Independence. See
William Paterson's Notes of Arguments in the Supreme Court (Feb. 6, 1795), in 6 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 236, at 428,
431.
239. William Paterson's Notes of Arguments in the Supreme Court (Feb. 10, 1795), in 6 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 236, at 448-
49.
240. Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 76.
241. Id. In the original notes, the argument is phrased "On the decl'n of independance, the
sovereignty was vested in Congress," William Paterson's Notes of Arguments in the Supreme Court
(Feb. 11, 1795), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, supra note 236, at 457-58, and "The King of Britain was formerly Sovereign of U.S. The
people divested the King, of it, & placed it in Congress," William Tilghman's Notes of Arguments
in the Supreme Court (Feb. II, 1795), in 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 236, at 461,463.
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pointed out, led to the fairly ridiculous conclusion that the Declaration
had actually lessened the power of the Continental Congress. 242 If there
was no national government until the Articles of Confederation were
ratified in 1781, as the plaintiffs maintained, then "How did we get
along?" the defendants asked sarcastically. "Were there 13 different
wars?
, ,24 3
The Supreme Court was thus squarely confronted with the legal status
of the Declaration. The Court minced no words in upholding the power
of the Continental Congress prior to the Articles of Confederation and
the importance of the Declaration in forming one American nation. The
opinion of Justice William Paterson (who had proposed the New Jersey
plan at the Constitutional Convention and was certainly no enemy of
state rights) stated,
[I]t became necessary for the people or colonies to coalesce and act
in concert.., they accordingly grew into union, and formed one
great political body, of which congress was the directing principle
and soul. As to war and peace, and their necessary incidents,
congress, by the unanimous voice of the people, exercised
exclusive jurisdiction, and stood, like Jove, amidst the deities of
old, paramount, and supreme. The truth is, that the states,
individually, were not known nor recognised as sovereign, by
foreign nations, nor are they now.2
For Paterson, "These high acts of sovereignty were submitted to,
acquiesced in, and approved of, by the people of America., 24 Justice
John Blair agreed. He observed that the Continental Congress "in short,
acted in all respects like a body completely armed with all the powers of
war; and at all this, I find not the least symptom of discontent among all
the confederated states, or the whole people of America. 24 6 Indeed,
"congress were universally revered, and looked up to as our political
fathers, and the saviours of their country., 247 Justice Iredell recognized
242. See William Paterson's Notes of Arguments in the Supreme Court (Feb. 9, 1795), in 6 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 236, at 434,
439.
243. Id. at 440.
244. Penhallow, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 81 (Paterson, J.).
245. Id. at 80. According to Paterson, the only way New Hampshire could have avoided the
power of the Continental Congress was to withdraw completely from the union. Id. at 82.




the Committee's jurisdiction on slightly different grounds. Iredell felt
that any authority exercised by the Continental Congress could only be
conveyed by the people of each state acting individually, not "by all the
people in the several provinces, or states, jointly." 48 Nonetheless, Iredell
found it "unquestionable" that Congress, with the "acquiescence of the
states" exercised the "high powers" of "external sovereignty,"'249 and that
the "articles of confederation amounted only to a solemn confirmation of
it."" A state could only avoid this power by "withdrawing from the
confederation" completely."
These views did not go completely unchallenged. In the 1796 case of
Ware v. Hylton ,z 2 Justice Chase suggested that the Declaration did not
mean that the "united colonies jointly, in a collective capacity, were
independent states... but that each of them was a sovereign and
independent state." 3 Nonetheless, Chase conceded that the Continental
Congress was effectively the organ of one nation, admitting that "the
several states retained all internal sovereignty; and that congress
properly possessed the great rights of external sovereignty." 4 In
"deciding on the powers of congress.., before the confederation,"
Chase "[saw] but one safe rule, namely, that all the powers actually
exercised by congress, before that period, were rightfully exercised, on
the presumption not to be controverted, that they were so authorized by
the people they represented." 5
In the early nineteenth century, lawyers repeatedly cited the
nationalist implications of the Declaration. As William Rawle argued in
1805, "The independence of America was a national act. The avowed
object was to throw off the power of a distant country; to destroy the
248. Id. at 94 (Iredell, J.).
249. Id. at 91.
250. Id. at 96.
251. Id. at 95.
252. 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 199 (1796).
253. Id. at 224 (Chase, J.). Justice Campbell approvingly cited this passage in his concurring
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 502 (1857).
In oral argument, John Marshall contended both that "Virginia... was an independent nation" in
1777, and that "America... must, from the 4th of July 1776, be considered as independent a nation
as Great Britain." Ware, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 210-11 (oral argument of John Marshall).
On the other side, Mr. Lewis contended that the revolutionary war was "waged against all
America, as one nation." Id. at 219 (oral argument of Attomey Lewis) (emphasis added).
254. Ware, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 232 (Chase, J.).
255. Id.
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political subjection; to elevate ourselves from a provincial to an equal
state in the great community of nations. '5 6 Another lawyer argued that,
"By the declaration of independence, the colonies became a separate
nation from Great Britain. ' '25 7 In an 1817 case, an attorney pointed out
that "by express decisions on the point, the principle was settled that our
existence as an independent nation commenced with our declaration of
independence in 1776. ",258 Chief Justice John Marshall, sitting on circuit,
agreed with that proposition.2 9
5. The Treatise of Joseph Story
The first great American constitutional law treatise is the 1833
treatise by Joseph Story, one of the towering figures in the history of
American law. Story's treatise synthesized many of the elements
discussed in this section and firmly endorsed the nationalist
understanding of the Declaration of the Independence.
Story argued that the Continental Congress derived its powers directly
from the people, and exercised its authority "not as the delegated agents
of the governments de facto of the colonies, but in virtue of original
powers derived from the people."26 The period surrounding the adoption
of the Declaration was important, Story maintained, because of its
relevance to "several very important considerations respecting the
political rights and sovereignty of the several colonies. '16' For Story, the
Declaration was manifestly the act of one American people:
[The Declaration of Independence] was not an act done by the
State governments then organized; nor by persons chosen by them.
It was emphatically the act of the whole people of the united
256. M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 293 (1805) (oral argument of William
Rawle) (emphasis added).
257. Lambert's Lessee v. Paine, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 97, 125 (1805) (oral argument of Attorney
Mason) (emphasis added); see also id. at 114 (oral argument of Francis Scott Key) ("[B]y... the
declaration of independence ... a new sovereignty was created."); Kilham v. Ward, 2 Mass. 236,
256 (1806) (oral argument of Nathan Dane) (arguing that a person became an American citizen on
July 4, 1776, the date of "the birth of the American nation") (emphasis omitted).
258. United States v. Hutchings, 26 F. Cas. 440,441 (C.C.D. Va. 1817) (No. 15,429).
259. See id. However, Marshall found that this did not mean that the American judiciary was free
to recognize as a foreign nation any entity that had issued a declaration of independence; rather, the
courts could only recognize those foreign nations that the executive had already recognized. See id.
at 441-42.
260. STORY, supra note 205, at 140.
261. Id. at 144.
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colonies, by the instrumentality of their representatives, chosen for
that, among other purposes .... It was an act of original, inherent
sovereignty by the people themselves, resulting from their right to
change the form of government, and to institute a new one,
whenever necessary for their safety and happiness.... The people
of the united colonies made the united colonies free and
independent states, and absolved them from all allegiance to the
British crown. The declaration of independence has accordingly
always been treated, as an act of paramount and sovereign
authority, complete and perfect per se, and ipso facto working an
entire dissolution of all political connection with and allegiance to
Great Britain. And this, not merely as a practical fact, but in a legal
and constitutional view of the matter by courts ofjustice.2
Story forcefully rejected the notion that the American people had
created thirteen independent states. The Declaration placed the states
"under the dominion of a superior controlling national government,
whose powers were vested in and exercised by the general congress with
the consent of the people of all the states.""26 Accordingly, "[fjrom the
moment of the declaration of independence.., the united colonies must
be considered as being a nation de facto, having a general government
over it created, and acting by the general consent of the people of all the
colonies." 2'
6. A Note on the Articles of Confederation
At first glance, the Articles of Confederation would seem to
contradict the idea that an American nation emerged with the adoption
of the Declaration of Independence. The second Article states, "Each
state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every
power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." This
section, and other provisions of the Articles (such as voting by states),
suggest that the Declaration had created thirteen independent nations.265
With the Articles, these nations confederated together for limited
purposes, but each nonetheless retained the fundamentals of
262. Id. at 149-50..
263. Id. at 152.
264. Id. at 152-53.
265. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. I.
Washington Law Review Vol. 76:701, 2001
nationhood.266 Although there is much to be said for this argument, it
does not necessarily undermine the idea that the Declaration created one
nation, at least with respect to the rest of the world. Indeed, the most
plausible reading of the Articles is that they are merely declarative of
what the Declaration had already accomplished.
The first thing worth noting about the Articles is that we got along
quite well without them. The Continental Congress did not bother to
approve them until November 15, 1777,267 and they did not go into effect
until March of 1781.268 Yet throughout this period, the Continental
Congress acted as a de facto national government. It conducted almost
the entire War of Independence against one of the most powerful nations
on earth. It requisitioned supplies, supported, trained, and governed the
Continental Army, organized a navy, negotiated treaties with foreign
nations, sent American ambassadors throughout Europe, heard appeals
from state courts in admiralty suits, and issued currency.269 In short, the
Congress acted as if it were the representative of one American nation.27°
266. See, e.g., MORTIMER J. ADLER, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: UNDERSTANDING THE IDEAS AND
IDEALS OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-17 (1987).
267. For an account of the ratification debates over the Articles of Confederation, see Eric M.
Freedman, Why Constitutional Lawyers and Historians Should Take a Fresh Look at the
Emergence of the Constitution from the Confederation Period: The Case of the Drafting of the
Articles of Confederation, 60 TENN. L. REV. 783 (1994).
Jack Rakove observes:
Nothing in the general reception the Articles received suggests that Americans were deeply
interested in discussing the nature of the union they were forming. No pamphlets were written
about them, and when the Articles were printed in American newspapers they appeared only as
another scrap of news, probably less important than reports of victory at Saratoga and almost
certainly less controversial than a growing number of essays proposing remedies for inflation.
RAKOVE, supra note 102, at 185.
268. It is also worth noting that the Articles did not look like typical treaties entered into between
sovereign nations. They were drafted by the Continental Congress and sent to the states for
ratification. Thus, no state created any separate agreements with any of the other states. The process
was centrally directed and states had the option of approval or disapproval, but they could not adjust
the Articles' terms.
269. See generally RAKOVE, supra note 102.
270. See, e.g., id. at 184-85 ("[T]he idea that the confederation was essentially only a league of
sovereign states was ultimately a fiction[;] Congress was in fact a national government, burdened
with legislative and administrative responsibilities unprecedented in the colonial past.").
The only substantive difference that ratification of the Articles brought to Congress was that its
directives were now styled "ordinances," rather than "resolves" or "recommendations." See Richard
P. McCormick, Ambiguous Authority: The Ordinances of the Confederation Congress, 1781-1789,
41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 411, 411 (1997).
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These powers are best seen as powers vested in the Congress by the
American people at the time of the Declaration. By creating the new
state constitutions, the people of each state vested control of state and
local affairs in the state governments. In no state did the people
explicitly confer any power over foreign affairs to their state
government. It was understood that these powers rested with the
Congress.271 Thus, the Articles of Confederation did not operate on a
clean slate. Under the Articles each state retained "every power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." Strictly
speaking, this does not mean that Congress had only those powers
delegated to it by the states; it means that states retained the powers
which they had not delegated to the Congress. And states could not
retain that which was not theirs to begin with.
Likewise, although each state "retains its sovereignty, freedom, and
independence," this clause reveals nothing about the scope of what was
retained. In light of the extensive powers Congress exercised at the time
of the ratification in 1781, the best reading of this clause is simply that
the states retained their sovereignty over their internal affairs, their
freedom to govern themselves as they saw fit, and their independence
from Britain, and were not absorbed into one American super-state.272
This is not to say that a state might not gain the powers of external
sovereignty for itself. If the people of the state agreed to withdraw
affirmatively from the union, at least prior to the Constitution, such
secession would probably have transferred those powers to the state. Just
as the powers of external sovereignty fell to the United States when it
withdrew from the British empire, so would those powers fall to a state
that withdrew from the American Union. But this would be a result of
the people's ultimate power to distribute sovereignty among organs of
271. See, ag., RAKOVE, supra note 102, at 150 ("Only in Connecticut-whose existing charter,
widely regarded as a model for republican government, required no revision-was a serious
question raised about the status of Congress when a Litchfield County convention proposed that
members of Congress be elected by the people.").
272. Cf. id. at 170-71 (suggesting that the clause was "ambiguous" and that the Congress viewed
it as "less significant" than its sponsor believed it to be).
Supporters of a thirteen nations argument might also point to the Articles' assertion that it formed
a "firm League of Friendship'" ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. Im. Yet the Articles also describe
themselves as "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
pmbl. Perpetual union is a quite different matter than a "firm League of Friendship."
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government; it would not be a function of a state's simply reclaiming a
power it had granted away under the Articles.
273
Finally, it is worth noting that contemporaries were familiar with the
argument that the Articles implied the existence of thirteen separate
nations. This argument was nonetheless decisively rejected by many
people who thought carefully about these issues, among them such
distinguished figures as James Wilson, William Paterson, and Joseph
Story. None of these people saw the Articles as contradicting the idea
that the Declaration was the act of one people creating an American
nation. Neither should we.
7. The Historical Evidence: A Summary
Sections A and B argued the Declaration is best interpreted as the act
of one American people creating an American nation. The evidence
outlined in this section confirms the merits of such a reading. Such an
interpretation was endorsed by such leading figures as James Madison,
James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, John Marshall, and John
Quincy Adams. It was endorsed in the Constitutional Convention; it was
endorsed in the courts of law; and it was endorsed by ordinary
Americans on Independence Day. In all these ways, Americans re-
affirmed their understanding of the origins of the American nation and
of the underlying sovereignty of the American people.
Ill. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FORMALISM
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the
Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the
Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to
273. See also RAKOVE, supra note 102, at 173-74 n.*:
A reconstruction of the precedents, events, and atmosphere of 1774-76 does not validate a
states'-rightist interpretation of the origins of the union. In addition to congressional
prerogatives over war and diplomacy, the procedures used to authorize the creation of new
governments in 1775-76 clearly demonstrate that sovereign powers were vested in Congress
from the start and that the emerging provincial regimes were regarded as subordinate bodies.
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alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its
Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such
Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and
Happiness.
This eloquent passage is the most celebrated in the Declaration of
Independence and among the most celebrated of all political writings in
American history.274 It is a powerful statement of American principles
and beliefs. Our understanding of this passage, however, has often been
obscured by simplistic readings that strip it of much of its subtlety. At its
worst, the passage simply becomes a convenient tool for courts wishing
to strike down any legislation that strikes them as violating some sort of
"natural right."275 This specter of rampant Lochner-ism is a powerful
force in legal academics' traditional aversion to the Declaration.
Standing in isolation, this passage has an ungrounded quality and an
ethereal feel that makes lawyers doubtful of its analytical power. What
constitutes a violation of these "unalienable rights," and what sort of
rights are they? Lacking specificity, the passage could be used to support
almost anything.
These concerns can be substantially eliminated by reading the passage
in the context of the entire Declaration. About one half of the
Declaration is devoted to the specific charges laid against George III.
Although these charges are almost entirely ignored today, for the
Continental Congress they were the most important part of the
Declaration. As Pauline Maier has put it, "Independence was justified
only if the charges against the King were convincing and of sufficient
gravity to warrant the dissolution of his authority over the American
people."276 The most careful British response to the Declaration, John
274. See, e.g., JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 10
(Vintage Books 1998) (1996) (describing the first lines of the second paragraph as "the most
famous and familiar words in American history"). Supreme Court justices often cite this paragraph
to explain the purposes of American government, although for some reason it is mostly cited in
dissents. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 489 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 330 n.1 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 531 n.13 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 533 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 n.3 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 233 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
275. See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
276. MAIER, supra note 3, at 105. Maier notes, "[The charges] were therefore essential to the
Declaration's central purpose, not subordinate to an assumed premise, as Carl Becker argued in one
of the more tortured passages in his book on the Declaration." Id. (citation omitted).
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Lind's An Answer to the Declaration of the American Congress, spent
only four of its 129 pages discussing the preamble.277 As Lind noted, "Of
the preamble I have taken little or no notice. The truth is, little or none
does it deserve. '278 For Lind, the issue was whether the charges were
accurate, a challenge subsequent American defenders of the Declaration
would take up.279 This task was more daunting then it appeared. Pauline
Maier has observed, "Today most Americans, including professional
historians, would be hard put to identify exactly what prompted many of
the accusations Jefferson hurled against the King, which is not surprising
since even some well-informed persons of the eighteenth century were
perplexed."280 However, to understand the philosophy of the Declaration,
the historical accuracy of the charges is of little consequence. What is
important is that the delegates thought that the actions charged had
occurred, and that these charges were sufficient to justify independence.
The charges against the King constitute the principal focus of this
Part. It is important to note that the charges do not simply recount
instances in which the King had deprived individuals of life, liberty, or
the pursuit of happiness. They were addressed to the far more serious
concern of a "Design to reduce [the Americans] under absolute
Despotism." It was this fear that justified revolution: "The History of the
present King of Great-Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and
Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute
Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a
candid World." ' ' The charges seek to establish that George fI is a
tyrant, which is not necessarily the same thing as saying that he has
violated the rights of life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Rather, the
presumption is that a despotism is so unlikely to safeguard these rights
that the people are justified in overthrowing it. Thus the Declaration
asserts, "A Prince, whose Character is thus marked by every act which
may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the Ruler of a free People." The
problem is not that George II is a prince, but that he has become a
tyrant.
277. See WILLS, supra note 93, at 65.
278. John Lind, An Answer to the Declaration of the American Congress, quoted in id. at 66.
279. One such attempt is B.J. Lossing, The Declaration Historically Considered, in SIGNERS OF
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (B.J. Lossing ed., New York, Cooledge 1848).
280. MAIER, supra note 3, at 106.
281. The Declaration refers to a "Design." By 1776, Americans had become convinced that there
was a conspiracy in Britain to deprive them of their liberties. See BAILYN, supra note 20, at 144-59.
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This emphasis on despotism is linked to the Declaration's deep
concern with what it terms "form." The Declaration legitimizes
revolution "whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of
these Ends." '282 Notice the prominence of the term "form." It is not
strictly necessary here, as the phrase could easily have read "whenever
any government becomes destructive of these ends." In quick succession,
the term appears twice more: The people are to organize new
government "in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness."283 Then, "Mankind are more disposed to
suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing
the Forms to which they are accustomed." 84 Later, the Declaration
charges the King with "altering fundamentally the Forms of our
Governments."28 Form had a slightly more definite meaning in the
eighteenth century than it does today; it implied a clear structure-
something with definite shape. This concern with form, of course, is a
hallmark of constitutionalism. By analyzing the appropriate forms of
government, the Declaration speaks in constitutional language.286
The charges against the King, therefore, are not so much rooted in
particular violations of natural rights, as they are in what I term
"constitutional formalism." Although the Declaration suggests that "any
form of government" might become destructive of the rights of the
people, the Declaration is far from neutral as to form. It categorically
rules out 'Despotism," "arbitrary Government," and "absolute Rule," for
example, as acceptable forms of government. More importantly, the
Declaration's charges display a close attention to the proper and distinct
spheres of legislative, executive, and judicial power and to the
paramount importance of the rule of law. The rights that George III
allegedly violated were not so much individual rights, but the collective





286. The Constitution guarantees to states a "Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST. art.
V, § 4.
287. The Declaration's grounding in self-government is clearly expressed in a letter written by
John Adams on June 23, 1776. Adams felt that with a declaration of independence, it would be
easier for the states to "ascertain the criminality of toryism" and to prevent the presses from
producing "seditious or traitorous speculations." Letter from John Adams to John Winthrop, June
23, 1776, reprinted in SPir OF SEVENTY-Six, supra note 168, at 307. It would lessen "[s]landers
upon public men," and provide the civil governments with a "vigor hitherto unknown." Id. at 307-
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This Part explores these themes through a close reading of the charges
against the King. Section A analyzes the Declaration's commitment to
the rule of law. Sections B, C, and D respectively address the legislative,
executive, and judicial powers. Section E summarizes the main points of
this Part.
A. The Rule of Law
One of the most prominent themes in the Declaration's charges
against the King is the importance of law in a well-governed society.
Indeed, the term "laws" serves as a sort of a pervasive refrain throughout
the body of the charges:
He has refused his Assent to Laws ....
He has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws ....
He has refused to pass other Laws ....
He has ... obstruct[ed] the Laws for Naturalization of
Foreigners ....
He has... refus[ed] his Assent to Laws for establishing
Judiciary Powers ....
He has ... subject[ed] us to a Jurisdiction...
unacknowledged by our Laws ....
For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a
neighbouring Province ....
For ... abolishing our most valuable Laws.288
Two important principles emerge from this collection of charges.
First, laws are not necessary evils, but positive and necessary goods.
Second, the law must be defended and obeyed, even by kings.
08. Whatever Adams perceived a declaration to mean, it had little to with the rights of minorities to
utter expressions of loyalty to Great Britain. Cf. United States ex reL Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
Gehr, 116 F. 520, 522 (N.D.W.Va. 1902) ("[T]here is not a word in the Declaration of




1. The Importance of Law
The first charge that the Declaration levels against the King is a
ringing affirmation of-the importance of law: "He has refused his Assent
to Laws; the most wholesome and necessary for the public Good." '289
What would it mean for a law to be "necessary?" Garry Wills has argued
that the term "necessary" is firmly rooted in the mechanistic world-view
of the Enlightenment: "It was the proudest boast of the world opened by
Newton's Principia that men could discern necessity at work, invariable,
in the flow of apparent chance."29 This sense of necessity is pervasive in
the Declaration, which begins, "WHEN in the Course of human Events,
it becomes necessary .... " Later it refers to the "Necessity which
constrains [the colonies] to alter their former Systems of
Government." 2 At the end, it simply resigns itself to the inevitable:
'"We must, therefore, acquiesce in the Necessity, which denounces our
Separation."'  Just as separation from England was required by the
course of events leading up to the Declaration, so are certain laws
required if a society is to function properly.294
The term "wholesome" also plays an important role here. A
"wholesome" law is one that performs some sort of improving function.
The word derives from Middle English terms for "health" and it came to
imply a promotion of well-being.2 95 As Shakespeare's Marcellus noted of
Christmas Eve: "And then, they say, no spirit can walk abroad; / The
nights are wholesome; then no planets strike, / No fairy takes, nor witch
hath power to charm." 6 A law that is "wholesome" for the "public
good," then, is a sort of medicine for the body politic-something that
improves the people and their lives and banishes the evils that would
otherwise beset them.
289. (emphasis added).




294. The Constitution reiterates the necessity of some laws. Article One, Section Eight of the
Constitution authorizes Congriss to make all laws "necessary and proper" for carrying out its
enumerated powers. Likewise, Article Two, Section Three requires the President to recommend to
Congress "s'uch Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."
295. See 20 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 291, 295 (1989).
296. WILLIAM SHAKEsPEARE, HAMI.r act 1, sc. I (emphasis added).
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The image of law is of an active, positive force in the lives of the
people. The claim is not that George I has permitted bad laws, but that
he has prevented the passage of good ones, a theme taken up in
subsequent charges: The King has "forbidden his Governors to pass
Laws of immediate and pressing Importance."'297 He has "refused to pass
other Laws for the Accommodation of Large Districts of People." He
has "endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that
Purpose obstructing the Laws for the Naturalization of Foreigners. '98
He has "obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent
to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers." It is striking that the charges
thus begin, not with a complaint that the King has violated natural rights,
nor with a complaint that he has approved bad law, but that there was
not enough good law. The lack of good law can evidently be as despotic
as the overwhelming presence of bad law. The Declaration has plenty to
say about bad law,299 but for the moment it is important to note how far
the Declaration is from an endorsement of the minimalist state.
2. Obedience to Law
An equally compelling principle is that kings are not above the law. In
this principle, we can see the deeply legalistic nature of the Declaration.
In an intriguing passage, the Declaration asserts, "He has combined with
others to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and
unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of
pretended Legislation." The "others" in this charge are members of
Parliament, a body the Declaration never mentions by name.3"0 Carl
Becker has suggested that for the Continental Congress it was a "point of
principle not on any account to pronounce the word Parliament," the
source of so many of the colonists' disputes with Britain."' What is most
striking, however, is the contention that the King and Parliament had
together violated "our Constitution" and "our Laws." It is a bit of a
mystery precisely what sort of "Constitution" is being referred to. n an
297. (emphasis added).
298. (emphasis added).
299. The Declaration iterates nine instances of bad laws ("pretended legislation," as the
Declaration puts it) passed by Parliament and approved by the King.
300. At a later point, the Declaration asserts, "We have warned [our British Brethren] from Time
to Time of Attempts by their Legislature to extend an unwarrantable Jurisdiction over us"
(emphasis added).
301. BECKER, supra note 114, at 19-20.
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earlier draft, the phrase read "our constitutions," but Congress changed
this to the singular form.3"2 In the plural, the phrase would almost
undoubtedly have referred to the constitutions and charters of the
individual colonies. But the singular rules this out. There must be a
constitution common to all Americans. It is hard to imagine what this
might be other than the British Constitution, which was the subject of
much discussion in the revolutionary period." 3 The British Constitution,
of course, was not a written constitution, but an accumulation of
unwritten practices that resulted in a balance of power between the king,
the lords and the commons. Americans perceived this constitution as
binding even the king himself.3 Accordingly, any ultra vires action by
the king would be null and void. The parliamentary legislation he
approved was thus "pretended Legislation." Likewise, the Declaration's
accusation that the King had committed "repeated Injuries and
Usurpations" is itself a denunciation of illegal action. The term "injury"
in its technical sense refers specifically to a violation of law; this is the
essence of the Latin injuria, that is, an act contrary to right.3"5 Similarly,
the term "usurpation" is meaningless outside of a normative framework
for evaluating the legality of exercises of power. The Declaration repeats
these terms in its conclusion, asserting, "Our repeated Petitions have
been answered only by repeated Injury," and that the Americans had
asked the British people to "disavow these Usurpations."
The Declaration's charge that the King and Parliament had asserted a
jurisdiction "unacknowledged by our Laws," closely echoes the charge
of "foreign to our Constitution." This passage suggests the two different
senses in which the Declaration employs the word "law." On the one
hand, there are the statutes and common law decisions, ordinary law
which the king is obligated to uphold and defend. In that sense, the
Declaration denounces the King and Parliament for "abolishing our most
valuable Laws" and for "abolishing the free System of English Laws in a
neighbouring Province." On the other hand, there is "law" in a larger
sense, the constitutional structures that limit and channel the authority of
the king. The king's obligations to preserve and protect the more
302. See id. at 178.
303. See, e.g., BAILYN, supra note 20, at 67 ("The word 'constitution' and the concept behind it
was of central importance to the colonists' political thought; their entire understanding of the crisis
in Anglo-American relations rested upon it.").
304. See, e.g., THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA
(1774), quoted in ELLIS, supra note 274, at 35-36.
305. See 7 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICnONARY 981 (1989).
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ordinary law follow directly from his duties under law in its larger sense.
When the king and Parliament abolished ordinary law, their actions were
thus illegal, not because they violated the laws that were abolished, but
because they violated the "Constitution" and the "Laws." Likewise, their
attempts to legislate for the colonies were an extension of "an
unwarrantable Jurisdiction." In other words, the king and Parliament
cannot legitimately act outside of the scope of the "Constitution" and the
"Laws."
But who is to judge whether the king and Parliament have violated the
laws? The Declaration makes abundantly clear that this power rests in
the people themselves: "when a long Train of Abuses and
Usurpations ... evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute
Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such
Government."3 °6 The final judge of the law is in a sense an immense
national jury, composed of the people deliberating about whether to
throw off their government. The ultimate interpretation of the
"Constitution" and "Laws" is therefore not in the hands of a mandarin
class, but in the hands of the people. This is not an invitation to lawless
violence, but a serious charge to the people as a whole. Revolution is
justified only when the people are convinced that their government has
persistently and consistently violated the law.
B. The Legislative Power
The Declaration places great value in representative legislatures as
protectors of the rights of the people. Many of the charges against the
King address obstructions of the legislative process. These obstructions
do not directly abridge any individual's life, liberty, or the pursuit of
happiness, but they do interfere dramatically with the people's right to
self-government.
The term "right" appears only twice in the charges, and in both
instances it relates to the functioning of representative legislatures. The
Declaration asserts that the King "has refused to pass other Laws for the
Accommodation of large Districts of People, unless those People would
relinquish the Right of Representation in the Legislature, a Right
inestimable to them, and formidable to Tyrants only." In Britain, many
districts were not entitled to send representatives to Parliament; this was




representatives from other districts. 7 The Declaration forcefully rejects
this notion of virtual representation. Representation is not simply a
convenient way to organize a government-it is a fundamental right to
which all people are entitled." 8 Accordingly, the charge pointedly links a
lack of representation with tyranny.
Why does representation matter? Because the legislature is the
primary guarantor of the rights of the people. The second instance of the
term "right" in the charges states, "He has dissolved Representative
Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly Firmness his Invasions on
the Rights of the People." Here the Declaration again emphasizes the
representative function of legislative bodies by referring to them as
"Representative Houses," rather than as "legislative houses." The
legislature is to protect the people's rights with "manly Firmness," a
phrase that suggests a certain stem republican virtue. This resonates
nicely with an image in the second paragraph: The people are entitled to
"provide new Guards for their future Security." Representative houses
filled the role of "guard" perfectly, which was why George III felt
compelled to dissolve them. Representative bodies will protect the rights
of the people precisely because they are representative of the people.
The importance of representation animates certain other charges the
Declaration lays against the King. With Parliament, he is accused of
"imposing Taxes on us without our Consent," and with "suspending our
own Legislatures." In one of the most maligned charges in the
Declaration, he is accused of "call[ing] together Legislative Bodies at
Places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the Depository of their
public Records, for the sole Purpose of fatiguing them into Compliance
with his Measures." This charge apparently referred to the moving of the
Massachusetts legislature from Boston to Cambridge by the royal
governor in 1768.309 British critics of the Declaration could scarcely
contain their derision of this clause. Thomas Hutchinson doubted that
Harvard College, four miles from Boston, was unusual, uncomfortable,
or distant from the public records, and could not fathom how this
"unimportant dispute between an American Governor and his Assembly"
could possibly be a "ground to justify Rebellion."'3 0 John Lind described
307. See generally BAILYN, supra note 20, at 161-75.
308. Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The conception of political equality from
the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth,
and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote.") (citation omitted).
309. See MAIERsupranote 3, at 110.
310. Quoted in id. at 111.
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the charge as "truly ridiculous," and wondered whether it was "inserted
by an enemy.., to throw an air of ridicule on the declaration in
general."3"' The Congress wisely chose not to dwell on the details of this
incident, but instead cast it in more general terms. Against the backdrop
of representation, the charge takes on more meaning. If a king could
"fatigue" legislative bodies into compliance with his own will, then the
entire purposes of representation would be destroyed. If the legislature
was forced to meet at places distant from the public records, it would be
impossible to legislate intelligently about public issues and the people's
right to adequate representation would thereby be diluted.
The Declaration contends that representative bodies are the most
appropriate organs to exercise the legislative power. In an interesting
charge, the Declaration reveals its understanding of this power:
He has refused for a long Time, after such Dissolutions, to
cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative Powers,
incapable of Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for
their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all
the Dangers of Invasion from without, and Convulsions within.
This charge makes clear that the legislative powers originate with the
people, to whom those powers return on the dissolution of legislative
assemblies. But this is obviously an extremely undesirable outcome. The
people at large should not be exercising the legislative power. Only a
representative legislature can wield these powers effectively and protect
the state from invasions and convulsions. By dissolving legislative
houses, the king reduces the colonies to a tumultuous ekklesia at best,
and to complete anarchy at worst.
In sum, the Declaration views representative legislatures as the
primary protector of the rights of the people. It is critically important
that these assemblies be truly representative, that they are protected from
interference and dissolution by the executive, and that their powers not
return to the people at large. Once again, the deeply formalist nature of
the Declaration is apparent. By placing such stress on the importance of
representative legislatures, the Declaration suggests that they are not
simply one possible form of government among many plausible
alternatives. Rather, representation in the legislature is essential to self-
government, the most important right the Declaration intends to protect.
311. Quoted in id. at I11.
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C. The Executive Power
In one sense, the entire Declaration is an essay on the misuse of
executive power, because each of the charges laid against the King
describes an abuse of his authority.312 This Section attempts to bring
more precision to the subject of the Declaration's perspective on
executive power. A good place to start is with the conclusion to the
charges, where the Declaration asserts, "A Prince, whose Character is
thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the
Ruler of a free People." This sentence demonstrates that the relationship
between monarchy and tyranny is not as direct as is often made out.
Indeed, the sentence implies that a "Prince" who did not engage in
tyrannous acts would be perfectly fit to be the "Ruler of a free People."
To modem ears, it seems strange that anyone might be the "Ruler" of a
free people; after all, the people should be ruling themselves. But in this
context, "Ruler" is simply a synonym for the executive authority. "Head
of a free People" might have captured the meaning slightly better, but
with less elegance; "Ruler" served just as well. A people might thus be
under a "Prince" yet still be "free." The key issue is whether that
"Prince" conducts himself as a constitutional monarch governed by the
rule of law, or acts as a lawless tyrant.313 Notice how this becomes a
question of personal character: "whose Character is thus marked by
every act which may define a Tyrant."31 4 It is not simply that George III
has done tyrannous things, but that he has a tyrannous character. The
distinction is subtle, but important. One who has done tyrannous things
might be restrained or reformed; one with a tyrannous character must be
overthrown, because he poses the greater threat to the people's liberties.
This is a reflection of the revolutionary generation's deep concern about
312. Cf. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501
U.S. 252, 273 (1991) ("The abuses by the monarch recounted in the Declaration of Independence
provide dramatic evidence of the threat to liberty posed by a too powerful executive.");Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("The example of
such unlimited executive power that must have most impressed the forefathers was the prerogative
exercised by George III, and the description of its evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me
to doubt that they were creating their new Executive in his image.").
313. Cf. Lucas, Justifying America, supra note 104, at 110 ("[Independence] was not likely to be
won without support from European monarchies such as France and Spain, neither of which would
be favorably impressed with a Declaration that inveighed against kingship.").
314. (emphasis added).
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public virtue, and about the essential character attributes of those who
would govern. 15
Of course, it will not always be easy for the people to determine
whether or not their leader displays a tyrannous disposition. This was
particularly true in the eighteenth-century, where few people ever met
their leader face-to-face (only a handful of Americans had actually met
George I). Accordingly, government must be structured to control the
potential tyrannous tendencies of those in power. The Declaration thus
provides an implicit framework for control of the executive. The main
features of this framework are limited veto powers, positive duties of
protection, civilian control of the military, and limits to the creation of
executive offices.
1. The Veto
Some of the Declaration's most bitter complaints concern the King's
use of his veto power to prevent the passage of laws favored by the
colonial assemblies."6 At least five of the Declaration's charges relate to
this abuse of the veto power. The inescapable conclusion seems to be
that the vesting of an absolute veto power in one individual creates a
dangerous likelihood of tyranny. This is especially true when the veto
power is wielded against representative legislatures, the very bodies the
Declaration contemplates as the prime protectors of the people's
liberties. A representative legislature whose enactments can be readily
discarded by an executive ceases to be a legislature at all, but becomes
merely a forum for the expression of discontent. As Gordon Wood has
explained, in 1776 "it seemed abominable that a single person should
have a negative over the voice of the whole society. 317
2. Positive Duties of Protection
The principle that the king has duties to his people dates back at least
to the medieval coronation oaths and is echoed in the oath that Article
Two of the Constitution provides for the President of the United States:
"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office
315. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 20, at 65-70.
316. Technically speaking, the King's disallowance of colonial acts, a power exercised through
the Privy Council, was different from his veto power over acts of Parliament. See DUMBAULD, supra
note 109, at 87. From the colonies' point of view, such a distinction was of little significance.
317. WOOD, supra note 20, at 141.
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of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability,
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States." '318
That George III owed positive legal duties to his people is made clear in
the Declaration: He has "utterly neglected to attend" to the passage of
important laws, and has "abdicated Government here, by declaring us
out of his Protection and waging War against us." This lack of action by
the King constitutes a violation of his affirmative duties as an executive.
Accordingly, he can be seen to have "abdicated" the office of king, in
essence leaving that office vacant for the people to fill as they deem fit.
These charges suggest that some sort of covenant or contract exists
between an executive and the people. The people entrust the executive
with the executive power; in exchange, the executive must exercise those
powers for the benefit of the people. As Thomas Jefferson put it in his
1774 pamphlet, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, the
king is "the chief officer of the people, appointed by the laws, and
circumscribed with definite powers, to assist in working the great
machine of government erected for their use, and consequently subject to
their superintendence." '319 It is not merely that the people have the power
to select an executive when that office is indisputably vacant. They have
the far more important power of determining for themselves the
conditions under which executive misfeasance or nonfeasance will
constitute an abdication of that office. Thus, in the Declaration it is the
"good People of these Colonies" who determine that George II has
"abdicated Government here."
3. Civilian Control of the Military
Since the threat of an overpowering military was never far from the
minds of the revolutionary generation,32 the Declaration also has much
to say about the relationship between the military and the executive
authority. The Declaration condemns the King for "affect[ing] to render
the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power." In similar
fashion, the Declaration asserts that the King "has kept among us, in
Times of Peace, Standing Armies, without the consent of our
Legislatures," and that the King and Parliament have "quarter[ed] large
Bodies of Armed Troops among us." Indeed, these charges suggest that
318. U.S. CONS. art H, § 1, cl. 8.
319. See supra note 304, at 35-36.
320. See, eg., AKXHL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 46-63 (1998).
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it was not merely a despotism that George 1I was supposedly trying to
impose on the American states; it was the worst sort of despotism-a
military despotism. The fundamental problem was making the military
both "independent" of and "superior" to the civilian authorities. Military
independence freed the military of civilian control; military superiority
in turn subjected the civilian authority to military control. To the
revolutionary generation, a standing army represented one of the greatest
threats to republican virtue and liberty.32' The Declaration takes pains to
point out that the Hessian troops hired by George 1I1 were not just
mercenaries, but an Army: "He is, at this time, transporting large Armies
of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the Works of Death, Desolation, and
Tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty and Perfidy,
scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous Ages, and totally unworthy the
Head of a civilized Nation." It is this image that the Declaration
contemplates as the inevitable result of an uncontrolled military.
Military dominance is a trait of tyrannous and "barbarous" nations; by
contrast, "civilized" nations can rigorously control the use of their
military power.
What is the fundamental problem with military control? After all, in
some circumstances, military control might be preferable to ineffective
civilian government."2 The fundamental problem, in the Declaration's
view, is that military rule is fundamentally inconsistent with
representative government. Military government is wrong, not so much
because it is likely to infringe on the people's individual liberties, which
it almost assuredly will, but because it infringes on the people's "Right
of Representation in the Legislature, a Right inestimable to them, and
formidable to Tyrants only."3 23  Although the people might be
represented in the local militia, they cannot be represented in armies,
which are rigidly hierarchical and governed by their own distinct rules
321. See id. at 53.
322. Consider, for example, an address given by General John Cadwalader, a leading figure in the
American Revolution, to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety in 1777:
We wish to see the civil authority regulate and direct all our public measures and should greatly
lament the necessity, which may compel the military power to take the direction in their hands,
in order to save this country from absolute ruin-but you may depend that the military will
exert its authority whenever the weakness, languor, or timidity of your councils shall render it
their duty so to do, and all the world will justify them in it.
General John Cadwalader, Address to the Pennsylvania Council of Safety (Jan. 15, 1777) (on file




and practices. It is the legislatures, not armies, who speak for the people;
consequently the slightest intrusions on representative legislatures
should be fervently resisted.
4. The Proliferation of Offices
Another abuse of executive authority is the creation of numerous and
unnecessary offices. The Declaration expresses this in colorful terms:
"He has erected a Multitude of new Offices, and sent hither Swarms of
Officers to harrass our People, and eat out their Substance." There is
more than a touch of the hyperbolic here, but the charge is nonetheless
interesting. New offices will of course be filled by new officers, and the
Declaration's use of the term "Swarms" readily equates these officers
with a biblical plague of locusts.324 Part of the problem, no doubt, is that
these officers would not be Americans, but faceless bureaucrats "sent
hither" from Britain. Again, the issue is a lack of accountability in
government and a disconnect between the people and their rulers.
5. The Executive Power: A Summary
In all of these ways, then, the Declaration suggests how the power of
the executive can be controlled. The Declaration does not necessarily
reject Alexander Hamilton's contention in The Federalist that "[e]nergy
in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government,"3" but it does emphasize the importance of channeling that
energy within narrow bounds. The Declaration is much more disturbed
by executive encroachment on the rights of the representative colonial
assemblies than it is about potential legislative encroachments on the
prerogatives of the Crown. As a means of preventing tyranny, this makes
perfect sense. In the minds of the drafters of the Declaration, executive
tyranny was a far more serious threat than legislative tyranny. To be
sure, the Declaration minces no words in denouncing the actions of
Parliament. The problem, though, was not that Parliament had
encroached on the prerogatives of the King; indeed, the Declaration
heartily denounces Parliament for having "combined," that is,
"conspired," with the King to form an absolute tyranny over the
American colonies. The problem was that Parliament was simply not the
324. See MAiER, supra note 3, at 110.
325. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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relevant legislature. The legislatures that mattered were the colonial
assemblies, and it was their rights that the King and Parliament were
infringing.
Once again, the Declaration is speaking not so much about individual
rights, but about structure. Properly constructed and faithfully executed,
the executive power can play an important role in preserving the
fundamental rights of self-government. Poorly structured and
imperfectly controlled, the executive power can quickly degenerate into
tyranny.
D. The Judiciary Power
The Declaration's discussion of the judiciary power is also grounded
in the preservation of self-government. The first charge to deal with the
judiciary asserts that the king had "obstructed the Administration of
Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary
Powers." The Declaration here specifically links the judiciary powers to
the administration of justice. But it is only a particular kind of judiciary
that is likely to administer anything resembling justice. The Declaration
thus carefully lays out its understanding of the proper role of judges and
of juries.
1. Judges
The Declaration addresses one charge to the role of judges. It
contends that the King "has made Judges dependent on his Will alone,
for the Tenure of their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their
Salaries." American judges have often cited this charge in support of
judicial independence,326 and, indeed, the charge does suggest the
importance of an independent judiciary. Note the striking contrast, for
example, between this charge and the military charge. The King is
denounced for making the military "independent," but he is equally
denounced for making judges "dependent." One might read the
Declaration of Independence, then, as a declaration of dependence for
the American military, but as a declaration of independence for the
American judiciary. 7
326. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
327. Indeed, one of the earliest and most forceful assertions of judicial independence in the
revolutionary era was directed not against the civilian government, but against the Continental
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There is much to be said for such a reading, but it is not quite
accurate. The issue was not so much that judges were dependent, but that
they were dependent on the wrong entity. Judges were supposed to be
accountable to the colonial assemblies, not to the king.28 A judge
appointed and paid by the king simply became one more petty executive
official, one more locust in the great "Swarm of Officers," to use the
phrase that immediately follows this charge. Such a person would have
no sense of the local community and no duties to the people at large. Far
better that judges be appointed by representative colonial assemblies or
by the people. Only if judges are accountable in this fashion, can self-
government be preserved. This does not necessarily mean that life tenure
or salary protection for judges would be inconsistent with self-
government, but it does mean that representative legislatures must have a
role in their selection and that there be some mechanism for removal in
cases of criminality or mental incapacity.
2. Juries
Although the Declaration discusses judges in only one charge, it
addresses juries in no fewer than three charges. This imbalance suggests
the vital role that the drafters of the Declaration envisioned for the jury.
Quite simply, the jury was the democratic branch of the judicial
department.3 Through juries, the people themselves would determine
when to impose the coercive power of the state on an individual.
The Declaration asserts that the King and Parliament had "depriv[ed]
us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury." The use of the term
Army. In April 1778, Pennsylvania Chief Justice Thomas McKean, a signer of the Declaration of
Independence, ordered Robert Hooper, a colonel in the Continental Army, to appear before him to
answer for a violent assault Hooper had committed on Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, the
Pennsylvania Attorney General, at the Reading Court of Quarter Sessions. Letter from Thomas
McKean to Nathaniel Greene (June 9, 1778), quoted in JOHN M. COLEMAN, THOMAS MCKEAm:
FORGOTrEN LEADER OF THE REVOLUTION 225 (1975). Hooper's commanding officer, General
Nathaniel Greene, wrote to McKean, claiming that he could not "without great Necessity concent"
to Hooper's absence. McKean replied:
I shall not ask your consent nor that of any other person in or out of the army, whether my
Precept shall be obeyed or not in Pennsylvania.... I should be very sorry to find, that the
execution of criminal laws should impede the operation of the army in any instance, but should
be more so to find the latter impede the former."
Id.
328. See, e.g., MAIER, supra note 3, at I 11.
329. The best exposition of this idea is in AMAR, supra note 320, at 81-118.
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"Benefits" nicely captures the importance of the jury. Jury trial was not
simply a "right" of the accused; it had "benefits" for the entire
community.33 Tocqueville, one of the most astute observers of the
American jury, would later observe, "The institution of the
jury... places the real direction of society in the hands of the
governed... and not in that of the government. '331 It was this element of
popular participation that drove the revolutionary generation's concern
for the preservation of the jury. Popular participation on juries lies
beneath two other charges that the Declaration lays against the King and
Parliament. Immediately after the jury charge, the Declaration denounces
"transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended Offences." This
charge echoes the Declaration's early dismissal of Parliamentary acts as
"pretended Legislation." At issue was the application of a statute from
the reign of Henry VII allowing the trial in England of treasons
committed outside the realm.332 The fundamental problem with this, of
course, was that it destroyed the privilege of trial by a local jury. Not
only would the individual be deprived of jurors drawn from his
community, but the local community would also be deprived of its right
to decide whether to apply the treason statute in a given case.333 In
similar fashion, the Declaration denounces the protection of British
troops by "a mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they
should commit on the Inhabitants of these States." A "mock trial" is one
in which local civilian juries do not have a meaningful voice.
E. The Constitutional Formalism of the Declaration
This Part has argued that the Declaration displays a pervasive concern
with the structure of government and with the rule of law. In this
manner, the Declaration is deeply formalistic and speaks in
constitutional language. This is powerful evidence that the "rights"
330. For an extended analysis of this point, see Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A
Constitutional Argument, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1658 (2000).
331. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 293 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945),
quoted in AMAR, supra note 320, at 88.
332. See MAIER, supra note 3, at 118. Maier notes, "Even the most assiduous efforts have,
however, identified no colonists of the revolutionaries' generation who were actually transported
'beyond seas to be tried for pretended offenses."' Id.
333. Juries were of exceptional importance in treason cases, often serving as the conscience of
the community against governments inclined to prosecute aggressively perceived disloyalty. See,
e.g., Larson, supra note 70, at 68-70, 107-08, 110-16 (analyzing the extremely high acquittal rates
in Pennsylvania treason trials between 1778 and 1783).
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about which the Declaration's famous second paragraph is most
concerned are not so much the natural rights of individuals against the
state or against the majority, but the rights of the American people to
self-government. The most important phrase in the second paragraph is
not so much "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness," but rather
"the Consent of the Governed." Charge after charge reiterates the ways
in which the King and Parliament have interfered with American self-
government. To be sure, the Declaration describes some direct assaults
on life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The charge, "He has
plundered our Seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our Towns, and destroyed
the Lives of our People," is a good example of this. But even this refers
to an assault on the American people as a whole; it describes violent acts
that directly interfere with the rights of self-government.
This deep concern for the preservation of self-government is reflected
in the Declaration's concern with the structure and the form of
government. Far from being neutral as to form, the Declaration specifies
the forms that are most likely to preserve self-government and, by
extension, the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. The Declaration imagines a government structured along
these lines as most conducive to securing the people's "Safety and
Happiness": the government must be founded in the rule of law and must
value the preservation of law as a valuable end in its own right. It must
recognize that no official is above the law and must provide mechanisms
for dealing with official lawlessness. It must have representative
legislatures responsive to the people, but it must not allow the legislative
powers to return to the people at large. It must limit the executive's
power of the veto, specify the executive's legal duties, and limit the
proliferation of executive offices. It must ensure that the military power
remains subordinate to the civilian authorities. It must protect judges
from interference by the executive power, and it must preserve inviolate
the role of juries in the courts. This basic outline of government is not
inconsistent with the state constitutions that were drafted after the
Declaration nor is it inconsistent with the Constitution framed by the
Convention of 1787. Although they differ in some details, all are broadly
concerned with protecting the people's right to self-government and with
protecting the people from self-interested government.
In his 1998 book, The Bill of Rights,334 Akhil Amar argues that the
Bill of Rights was not primarily about vesting "individuals and
334. AMAR, supra note 320.
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minorities with substantive rights against popular majorities"; rather, it
was about "structural ideas" intended "not to impede popular majorities
but to empower them." '335 This Part has offered a similar analysis of the
Declaration of Independence. For too long, the Declaration has been
seen as a rather vacuous endorsement of indefinable and ghostly natural
rights. When we strip away the interpretive overlay of the Lochner era,
we can see the Declaration that its drafters saw: a Declaration with very
specific notions about the structure of government, and a Declaration
that, above all else, is committed to the right of the American people to
govern themselves. On this, Jefferson's last letter serves well as the last
word: "May [the Declaration of Independence] be to the world, what I
believe it will be... the signal of arousing men to burst the chains under
which monkish ignorance and superstition had persuaded them to bind
themselves, and to assume the blessings and security of self-
government. '336
IV. CONCLUSION
On July 3, 1776, John Adams wrote to his wife Abigail:
The second day of July, 1776, will be the most memorable epocha
in the history of America. I am apt to believe that it will be
celebrated by succeeding generations as the great anniversary
festival. It ought to be commemorated as the day of deliverance, by
solemn acts of devotion to God Almighty. It ought to be
solemnized with pomp and parade, with shows, games, sports,
guns, bells, bonfires and illuminations, from one end of this
continent to the other, from this time forward, forevermore.
You will think me transported with enthusiasm, but I am not. I am
well aware of the toil, and blood, and treasure, that it will cost us to
maintain this declaration, and support and defend these States. Yet,
through all the gloom, I can see the rays of ravishing light and
glory. I can see that the end is more than worth all the means, and
335. Id. at xii.
336. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Roger Weightman (June 24, 1826), in JEFFERSON'S
LETTERS, supra note 224, at 666 (emphasis added).
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that posterity will triumph in that day's transaction, even although
we should rue it, which I trust in God we shall not.337
Adams's predictions were remarkably prescient. He only got one
thing wrong-the date. Americans do not (and never did) celebrate the
day that Congress voted to approve Richard Henry Lee's motion on
independence. We celebrate the day that Congress approved the
Declaration of Independence. Why? Because even more important than
independence itself was how that independence was declared and
justified. We celebrate the Declaration because it marks the birth of an
American nation, because it dedicates America to the principle of self-
government, and because it confirms the inherent sovereignty of the
American people. The vote on July 2 did not do this, but the vote on July
4 did.338
For too long, these important features of the Declaration have been
obscured in the legal community by a misguided focus on individual
natural rights. As a result, it has been easy to consign the Declaration to
irrelevance and oblivion. This Article has argued that the deepest
principles of the Declaration are not about an individual's natural rights
against the state, but about the right of the American people to self-
government and about the formal structures that allow self-government
to flourish. When we understand the Declaration in this fashion, we can
better appreciate the Declaration's place in American law.
337. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 3, 1776, reprinted in SPIRIT OF SEVENTY-
Six, supra note 168, at 321. Late in life, Adams, envious of Thomas Jefferson's fame as the
principal draftsman of the Declaration and fearful that his own contributions were being eclipsed,
dismissed the Declaration as a "theatrical side show," and complained that "Jefferson ran away with
the stage effect... and all the glory of it." Quoted in ELLIS, supra note 274, at 292.
338. Even as a purely legal matter, the Declaration, and not the July 2 vote, created American
independence. The voicing of the Declaration suggests that it is doing something in the present
moment Thus, it states, "we declare," not we "have declared" or we "have resolved." "Declaring,"
of course, had a distinctly legal connotation. A declaratory judgment, familiar from equity, declared
the rights of individual parties in the same way that the Declaration declared the rights of the
American people. Cf. PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 72-77 (1990) (tying the Declaration to forms of equitable
pleading). A declaration of war altered the legal status between two countries in the same way that
the Declaration altered the relationship between the colonies and Great Britain. (The Constitution
grants Congress the power to "declare War." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (emphasis added).) The
resolution of July 2 might easily have been the subject of a motion to reconsider; once independence
was "declared," such a motion could not have succeeded. Finally, all legal decisions, from the
eighteenth century forward, have treated the Declaration, not the July 2 vote, as the legal act of
independence.
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First, reading the Declaration as the act of one American people
creating an American nation makes sense of a number of judicial
decisions that cannot be justified if the Declaration created thirteen
independent nations. These include cases dating United States
citizenship to the Declaration of Independence,339 cases justifying United
States control over the shoreline,34 and cases concerning the foreign
affairs powers of the federal government.34'
Second, the nationalist understanding of the Declaration is relevant to
one of the most divisive issues in modem constitutional law, the so-
called "sovereign immunity" of the states. A paramount principle of the
Declaration is that the people, not governments, are sovereign.342 Any
"sovereignty" the state governments possess is theirs because the
sovereign American people gave it to them. Quite simply, the states have
never been completely sovereign and independent nations. Invoking their
''sovereignty" to avoid suit in federal court for violations of federal law
fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the federal union. A
Declaration that denounces "mock trials," celebrates the role of juries
and the rule of law, attacks judicial subservience to the executive, and
condemns a "swarm of officers" for "harrass[ing] our people" offers
little support for a doctrine that keeps citizens out of court when
government lawlessness infringes on their rights.343
Third, recognizing the grounding of the Declaration in popular
sovereignty rescues it from the Lochner-esque reasoning with which it is
339. See cases cited supra note 64.
340. See, e.g., United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515, 520 (1975) ("[D]ominion over the marginal
sea was first accomplished by the National Government rather than by the Colonies or by the
States."); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 31 (1947) ("[W]e cannot say that the thirteen
original colonies separately acquired ownership to the three-mile belt or the soil under it.").
341. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
342. The classic statement of popular sovereignty as a rejection of governmental sovereignty is
Amar, supra note 101.
343. Some judges have recognized that the Declaration may be relevant to sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 95 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
recitation in the Declaration of Independence of the wrongs committed by George III made [the
proposition that the king could do no wrong] unacceptable on this side of the Atlantic."); Nevada v.
Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 415 (1979) ("[The fiction that the king could do no wrong] was rejected by the
colonists when they declared their independence from the Crown."); City and County of Denver v.
Madison, 351 P.2d 826, 831 (Colo. 1960) (Frantz, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Declaration
repudiates governmental immunity from tort suits), Bulman v. Hulstrand Constr. Co., 521 N.W.2d
632, 641 (N.D. 1994) (Sandstrom, J., concurring) (noting inconsistency between the Declaration
and sovereign immunity); Fowler v. City of Cleveland, 126 N.E. 72, 78 (Ohio 1919) (Wanamaker,




often associated. Anyone who argues that a particular law violates the
Declaration of Independence because it infringes on some perceived
individual natural right misunderstands the Declaration. There is not one
line in the Declaration about the empowerment of minorities against
popular majorities.3" The core principle of the Declaration is the
people's right of self-government; it is this principle that pervades all of
the charges against the King. The mistake of the Lochner era was to read
into the Declaration's second paragraph a vision of economic laissez-
faire that is unsupported by anything else in the Declaration's text.
Courts attentive to the entire text of the Declaration would have
recognized that individual rights are not the only rights at stake when a
law is challenged. Equally at stake is the people's right to self-
government through representative legislatures, a right far more
important to the Declaration than the rights, for example, of butchers and
bakers to carry on their livelihood in whatever fashion they saw fit.
Fourth, a reconsideration of the Declaration helps define with more
precision when it is appropriate for courts to cite the Declaration. This is
particularly relevant in those states that appear to have adopted the
"principles of the Declaration of Independence" as part of their positive
law.34 As should now be clear, it will rarely be sufficient to cite the
Declaration in opposition to some law that supposedly violates
individual rights, because there will almost always be an opposing
interest of self-government.346 It is in cases involving the structural
principles of government that the Declaration can play a more valuable
role. The most suggestive cases along these lines are those that employ
the Declaration as a "negative constitution." '347 These cases have
intuitively understood that the Declaration can speak to structure, but
none of them quite realized the degree to which structural concerns
animate the entire Declaration. This Article has attempted to move the
analysis forward by demonstrating how the charges form a coherent
structural vision-a vision that may be persuasive in resolving structural
344. By this, I do not mean to suggest that the protection of minorities is not a critical thread in
the fabric of American law. It is. But this is much more a result of the Reconstruction Amendments
than of the political ideas that animate the Declaration of Independence. See generally AMAR, supra
note 320.
345. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
346. It is possible that some laws might be so oppressive that they create aprimafacie case that
the process of representation has utterly broken down. In such a case, violation of individual rights
may be indicative of the violation of the collective right of the American people to self-govemment.
347. See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
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questions in the interpretation of the state constitutions and the
Constitution of the United States.
Fifth, focusing on the Declaration of Independence brings to light the
fascinating pre-constitutional history of the United States. In the legal
community, it often seems as if nothing of any significance happened
before 1787. This Article has demonstrated the fallacy of that belief. By
carefully studying the period between 1776 and 1787, we can gain a
much better understanding of the origins of our country and of the
principles upon which it was founded.
The parchment copy of the Declaration of the Independence now rests
in a massive bulletproof container in the National Archives Building in
Washington, D.C., where it is viewed by thousands of visitors every
year. Immediately below the Declaration, one can view two pages of the
parchment copy of the Constitution and the parchment copy of the
twelve amendments to the Constitution proposed by the First Congress,
ten of which became our Bill of Rights. The writing on the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights is still bright and crisp, but the Declaration has
worn badly. Years of exposure to the sun and a poorly executed attempt
to create a facsimile in 1823 have rendered it almost entirely illegible. 348
The placement of the documents in the Archives accentuates the
elusiveness of the Declaration. Whereas the Constitution and Bill of
Rights are conveniently placed at eye level, the Declaration is higher and
further back; the visitor to the Archives must strain mightily to lean over
the Constitution to make out any words in the Declaration.
This physical arrangement of our nation's founding documents is
perfectly symbolic. The familiar words of the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights have been parsed and re-parsed by lawyers in thousands of
cases over the past two centuries. But the Declaration is always just
beyond the horizon, in the nether twilight where familiarity blends into
shadows. It is the vague ethereal presence that somehow looms so deeply
behind the Constitution that even legally-trained Presidents of the United
States can easily confuse the two documents.349
This Article has attempted to bring the Declaration into sharper focus,
bringing clarity to those lines that are so elusive in the National
Archives, and, perhaps, bridging the gap between the Declaration and
348. See MAIER, supra note 3, at xi.
349. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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the documents that lie beneath it. Both Abraham Lincoln and Roger
Brooks Taney would have understood why the Declaration holds such a
pride of place in the Archives. These men recognized, in their own way,
the important role the Declaration plays in American law. For Lincoln,
the Declaration was the founding document of the American nation, a
document committed to "government of the people, by the people, for
the people."35 For Taney, the Declaration was a source of deep
structural principles of government. This Article has argued that on these
points, both men were right. Right not only because of their
understanding of the Declaration, but because they bothered to consider
it at all. For both men correctly understood the Declaration not as a
curiosity of interest only to antiquarians, but as a living source of
principles of government-principles that 225 years later continue to
define and shape this great experiment in self-government that we call
the United States of America.
350. Lincoln, supra note 183, at 104.
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Appendix: The Dunlap Broadside, the First Printing of the
Declaration of Independence
IN CONGRESS, JULY 4, 1776.
A DECLARATION
BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
IN GENERAL CONGRESS ASSEMBLED.
WHEN in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one
People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with
another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and
equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle
them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.
WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of
Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the
Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive
of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to
institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that
Governments long established should not be changed for light and
transient Causes, and all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more
disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long
Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object,
evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their
Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new
Guards for their future Security. Such has been the patient Sufferance of
these Colonies; and such is now the Necessity which constrains them to
alter their former Systems of Government. The History of the present
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King of Great-Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and Usurpations,
all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny
over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid
World.
HE has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and
necessary for the public Good.
HE has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of immediate and
pressing Importance, unless suspended in their Operation till his Assent
should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to
attend to them.
HE has refused to pass other Laws for the Accommodation of large
Districts of People, unless those People would relinquish the Right of
Representation in the Legislature, a Right inestimable to them, and
formidable to Tyrants only.
HE has called together Legislative Bodies at Places unusual,
uncomfortable, and distant from the Depository of their public Records,
for the sole Purpose of fatiguing them into Compliance with his
Measures.
HE has dissolved Representative Houses repeatedly, for opposing
with manly firmness his Invasions on the Rights of the People.
HE has refused for a long Time, after such Dissolutions, to cause
others to be elected; whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of
Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the
State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the Dangers of Invasion
from without, and Convulsions within.
HE has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that
purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing
to pass others to encourage their Migrations hither, and raising the
Conditions of new Appropriations of Lands.
HE has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his
Assent to Laws for establishing Judiciary Powers.
HE has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure of
their Offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries.
HE has erected a Multitude of new Offices, and sent hither Swarms of
Officers to harrass our People, and eat out their Substance.
HE has kept among us, in Times of Peace, Standing Armies, without
the consent of our Legislatures.
HE has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to
the Civil Power.
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HE has combined with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to
our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his Assent to
their Acts of pretended Legislation.
FOR quartering large Bodies of Armed Troops among us:
FOR protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any
Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States:
FOR cutting off our Trade with all Parts of the World:
FOR imposing Taxes on us without our Consent:
FOR depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury:
FOR transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended Offences:
FOR abolishing the free System of English Laws in a neighbouring
Province, establishing therein an arbitrary Government, and enlarging its
Boundaries, so as to render it at once an Example and fit Instrument for
introducing the same absolute Rule into these Colonies:
FOR taking away our Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws and
altering fundamentally the Forms of our Governments:
FOR suspending our own Legislatures, and declaring themselves
invested with Power to legislate for us in all Cases whatsoever.
HE has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his
Protection and waging War against us.
HE has plundered our Seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our Towns, and
destroyed the Lives of our People.
HE is, at this Time, transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries
to compleat the Works of Death, Desolation, and Tyranny, already
begun with circumstances of Cruelty and Perfidy, scarcely paralleled in
the most barbarous Ages, and totally unworthy the Head of a civilized
Nation.
HE has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas
to bear Arms against their Country, to become the Executioners of their
Friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.
HE has excited domestic Insurrections amongst us, and has
endeavoured to bring on the Inhabitants of our Frontiers, the merciless
Indian Savages, whose known Rule of Warfare, is an undistinguished
Destruction, of all Ages, Sexes and Conditions.
IN every state of these Oppressions we have Petitioned for Redress in
the most humble Terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only
by repeated Injury. A Prince, whose Character is thus marked by every
act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the Ruler of a free People.
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NOR have we been wanting in Attentions to our British Brethren. We
have warned them from Time to Time of Attempts by their Legislature
to extend an unwarrantable Jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them
of the Circumstances of our Emigration and Settlement here. We have
appealed to their native Justice and Magnanimity, and we have conjured
them by the Ties of our common Kindred to disavow these Usurpations,
which, would inevitably interrupt our Connections and Correspondence.
They too have been deaf to the Voice of Justice and of Consanguinity.
We must, therefore, acquiesce in the Necessity, which denounces our
Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of Mankind, Enemies in
War, in Peace, Friends.
WE, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS, Assembled, appealing to the
Supreme Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions, do, in
the Name, and by the Authority of the good People of these Colonies,
solemnly Publish and Declare, That these United Colonies are, and of
right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are
absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political
Connection between them and the State of Great-Britain, is and ought to
be totally dissolved; and that as FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES, they
have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances,
establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which
INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do. And for the support of this
Declaration, with a finn Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence,
we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred
Honor.
Signed by ORDER and in BEHALF of the CONGRESS,
JOHN HANCOCK, PRESIDENT.
ATTEST. CHARLES THOMSON, SECRETARY.
PHILADELPHIA: PRINTED BY JOHN DUNLAP.
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